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Abstract 
 
Results support Arestis’s theory, that low real interest rates do not prevent economic 
growth (though he related it to the regulation debate).  Here in the deregulation 
environment, it also stands.  Results also support Shaw’s assertion that financial 
liberalisation increases the monetary sector.  Stiglitz’s theory, that government 
intervention leads to improved quality of loans, is contradicted as the reduction of state 
involvement led to bad loans falling.  Support is given to Everett and Kelly’s view that 
financial liberalisation supports growth.  Finally King and Levine studies are supported – 
banking sector development leads to faster growth, and also Barth’s view that state 
involvement leads to poorly developed banks. 
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Non technical summary 
 
The banking sectors in all three countries experienced change once financial 
liberalisation began.  In the Czech Republic the number of domestic banks increased 
from 1990-1995 and then fell up to 2003.  No foreign banks existed in 1990 and these 
increased year on year to 2003.  Hungary also experienced a large increase in foreign 
ownership of banks in this period (1990-2003) while in Poland the number of domestic 
banks fell and there was an increase in the number of foreign banks in operation. 
 
The Czech Republic suffered from a bad loan problem.  Various attempts were made to 
overcome this: the KOB acted as a receiver for other banks’ debts.  The NBP provided 
funds in 1993, 1994 and 1995 for income losses due to bankruptcies of banks.  The 
Banking Act was amended in 1994 to provide more stringent supervision.  Banks failed 
in 1994, 1995 and 1996.  The deposit insurance scheme was used to support failing small 
banks and the state propped up failing large banks.  In 1996 the Stabilisation Programme 
helped to strengthen public confidence in the banking system.  By 1998 large inflows of 
foreign direct investment helped to create credit levels through to 2000. 
 
In Hungary the State had a large controlling interest in most banks, but this changed after 
financial liberalisation when privately owned and foreign banks entered the market.   
Hungary suffered from bad loan problems mainly due to the fact that shareholders in 
banks (whether state owned firms or privately owned firms) received large flows of 
credit.  Credit standards were lowered as a result, thus exacerbating the bad loan problem.  
In 1992 strengthened bank regulations along with a recession, led to banks failing.  In 
1992 the SBSA enforced rules on bank supervision and new standards were introduced 
for credit control.  While credit to households and enterprises reduced in 1992-1994, the 
state was forced to intervene five times to help the bad loan problem.  By the end of the 
nineties most of the equity capital of banks was owned by foreign investors while five 
large banks dominated the banking sector.   
 
The recession in the early 1990’s worsened the bad loan problem in Poland.  By 1992 
new rules on capital adequacy and bad debt provision put extra pressure on banks.  In 
1993 some co-operative banks failed and weak banks were put under mandatory external 
control.  This trend continued to 1996 and the NBP declared bankruptcy of 61 banks.  In 
the late nineties an increase in the number of foreign banks and the expansion of private 
banks led to the overall banking system becoming more competitive.  By 2002 the 
number of bank operating in Poland fell, as a result of consolidation and mergers.  The 
bad loan problem worsened as household finance deteriorated. 
 
Results on the relationship between financial deregulation and economic growth 
(financial variables and Industrial Production) showed, in the Czech Republic, bi-
directional causality for M0 and Industrial Production while Credit to Government 
caused Industrial Production.  Industrial Production caused M2, Deposits in Commercial 
Banks, Deposits held in the Central Bank and Commercial Banks, and Exports & 
Imports.  Hungary had a bi-directional causality between Credit to the Private Sector, 
Credit to the Non-Financial Sector, Credit to Government, Deposits in Commercial   2
Banks, Deposits in the Central Bank and Commercial Banks, Exports & Imports and 
Industrial Production.  Industrial Production caused M0 and M2 but not vice versa.   
Poland showed bi-directional causality for all financial variables (M0, M2, CRPR, 
CRNF, DPC, DPCC and EXIMP and Ind Prod). 
 
Ratios for M0 and M2 to Industrial Production showed increases for all three countries.  
Treasury Bill Interest Rates fell for all three.  Private Sector Credit to Domestic Credit 
fell overall in the Czech Republic, it rose overall in Hungary, and fell and then rose in 
Poland though the end result was lower than the level experienced in 1990.  The level of 
Credit to Government showed the opposite trend for all three countries i.e. in the Czech 
Republic it increased overall especially at the end of the period, in Hungary and Poland it 
rose initially and then fell.  The level of deposits in commercial banks to deposits in the 
central bank and commercial banks, rose overall in the Czech Republic showing 
increased lending activity by the central bank.  Hungary showed a steady performance 
while it increased in Poland.  The interest rate ratio fell in all three countries while the 
Exports&Import ratios rose.   
 
Ratios for profitability showed that the average Return on Equity fluctuated and then rose 
in the Czech banks, and fell in both Hungary and Poland.  The Return on Assets 
fluctuated and rose in the Czech Republic, steadied then rose and fell in Hungary, and 
fluctuated then fell in Poland.  The Equity Multiplier ratio rose overall in the Czech 
Republic and fluctuated in both Hungary and Poland. 
 
Efficiency ratios indicated that Non Interest Earnings to Total Assets rose overall in the 
Czech Republic, fluctuated in Hungary and fell in Poland.  Total Expenses to Total 
Assets fluctuated in the Czech Republic, fluctuated and then steadied in both Hungary 
and Poland. 
 
Bad loans fluctuated and then steadied in the Czech Republic and fell in Hungary and 
Poland. 
 
In conclusion financial deregulation led to financial development (M0 and M2 increased 
overall for all three countries over the period).  Financial deregulation led to economic 
growth as private sector credit increased in Hungary, there were increases from the mid 
nineties in Poland and it was steady in the Czech Republic.  Causality was established 
between financial deregulation/development and economic growth with bi-directional 
causality established for the majority of financial variables and industrial production.             
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1.0 Introduction 
 
This study examines the effect financial deregulation has on financial development, and 
the extent to which this impacts on economic growth in three countries: the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Poland.  This chapter answers the following questions: 
i)  does financial deregulation lead to financial development in the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Poland? 
ii)  does financial development lead to economic growth in the three countries? 
iii)  is causality established between financial deregulation/development and 
economic growth?   
iv)  what direction/s does it take? 
 
The chapter is organized as follows: 
Section 2 examines the background to financial sectors in the three countries. 
Section 3 investigates empirical findings on financial deregulation/development and 
economic growth in other countries. 
Section 4 presents empirical findings on financial deregulation in the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Poland. 
Section 5 examines the relationship between financial variables and industrial production 
using ratio analysis. 
Section 6 analyses bank profitability using ratios. 
Section 7 analyses bank efficiency using ratios. 
Section 8 examines bad loans. 
Section 9 summarises results to date. 
Section 10 concludes the chapter. 
 
2.0  Financial Sector in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland 
 
Below is a presentation of all the monetary financial institutions in the three countries in 
2003.  Note that the Czech Republic’s total MFI’s equals 36% of  
Hungary’s MFI’s.  In turn Hungary’s total equals 36% of Poland’s MFI’s. 
 
 
Table 2.1      Monetary Financial Institutions 
Countries  All MFI’s  Central Bank  Credit 
Institutions 
Money Market 
Funds 
Czech Republic  86  1  77  8 
Hungary 238  1  222  15 
Poland 661  1  660  0 
Source: European Central Bank, List of Monetary Countries in the Accession Countries,  
February 2004.  Above is the number of financial institutions currently existing in the 
three countries.  A breakdown of each country is shown in the next section. 
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Table 2.2                     Czech Republic 
 Total 
Banks 
State 
Banks 
State 
Owned 
Banks 
Czech 
Controlled
Total Foreign 
Controlled 
Banks 
Bank 
Branches 
Total 
Jan90    5  4  1  0 5  0 0  0 
Dec 
1990 
9  4  1  4 9  0 0  0 
Dec 
1991 
24 4  1  15  20  4  0  4 
Dec 
1992 
37 1  4  212  26  9  2  11 
Dec 
1993 
52  1  5  28 34  12 6 18 
Dec 
1994 
55  1  5  28 34  13 8 21 
Dec 
1995 
55  1  6  25 32  13 10  23 
Dec 
1996 
53  1  6  23 30  14 9 23 
Dec 
1997 
50  1  6  19 26  15 9 24 
Dec 
1998 
45  1  5  14 20  15 10  25 
Dec 
1999 
42  1  4  10 15  17 10  27 
Dec 
2000 
40 1  4  9  14  16  10  26 
Dec 
2001 
38 0  3  9  12  16  10  26 
Dec 
2002 
37 0  2  9  11  17  9  26 
Dec 
2003 
35 0  2  7  9  17  9  26 
Source: Czech Central Bank Website
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 http://www.cnb.cz/en/bd_ukazatele_tab01.php   5
Hungary 
 
Table 2.3 
 
Number of Financial Institutions by Type 1990-1995 (End of Period) 
 
  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Commercial 
banks of 
which: 
20 31 32 35 36 35 
Hungarian 
owned 
12 18 16 15 15 14 
Foreign or 
Jointly 
owned 
8  13 16 20 21 21 
Specialised 
Financial 
Institutions 
9 5 8 8 8 8 
Insurance 
Companies 
6  11 13 13 13 13 
Savings Co-
operatives 
260 259 258 255 255 255 
Source: National Bank of Hungary (includes one off-shore bank) 
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Poland 
 
Table 2.4 
 
Polish Banks 1993-2002 
 
  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Commercial 
Banks of 
which: 
87 82 81 81 83 83 77 74 71 64 
Banks with 
majority 
public 
sector 
interest of 
which: 
29 29 27 24 15 13 7  7  7  7 
Directly 
owned by 
Treasury 
16  15  13  8 6 6 3 3 3 3 
Indirectly 
owned by 
Treasury 
11  11  11  13  8 7 4 4 4 4 
Owned by 
NBP 
2 3 3 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Banks with 
majority 
private 
sector 
interest of 
which: 
58 53 54 57 68 70 70 67 64 57 
Under 
Polish 
control 
48 42 36 32 39 39 31 20 16 10 
Under 
foreign 
control 
10 11 18 25 29 31 39 47 48 47 
Co-
operative 
banks 
1608 1653 1610 1394 1295 1189 781  680  642  608 
Total  Banks 1740 1694 1591 1475 1378 1272 858  754  713  692 
Source: National Bank of Poland, General Inspectorate of Banking Supervision 
Summary Evaluation of the Financial Situation of Polish Banks, October 2002 
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2.1  Developments in the Banking Sector 1990-2003 
 
1.1.1  Czech Republic 
 
In 1990, with the changeover to a market based economy, the Czech monobank system 
was split into a two tier system: the Czech National Bank and four state financial 
institutions.  By 1992 there was only one state financial institution left – Konsolidacni 
Banka (KOB), which acted as the receiver for the other banks bad debts
2.  The 
government initiated several operations to clean up the bad loan problem: in 1991 a block 
of credits issued by the old monobank was transferred from Komercni Banka to KOB.  
That same year four banks were recapitalized.  Also the National Property Fund issued 
bonds to two banks to increase their capital.  The KOB purchased 15 billion Czech 
Kroner for 80% of their face value from three banks, with the banks writing of the final 
20%.  In 1993 the NPF provided capital of three billion to the KOB, and in 1994 they 
provided further funds of 15.8 billion to KOB for income losses due to bankruptcies.  
More funds were provided in 1995 to strengthen KOB reserves to fifteen billion. 
 
By 1993 out of fifty two banks, only twenty four banks were fully Czech owned.  Czech 
banks tended to grant credit to non-financial enterprises and households, rather than the 
State.  Banks credits to the State accounted for around 5% of bank assets and the State 
avoided major budgetary deficits.  The Czech Republic still suffered from bad loans.  
50% of assets were in the form of bank loans with 39% classified as non-performing by 
1995.  In 1994 the Czech National Bank strengthened its supervisory powers under the 
amendment of the Banking Act, which also provided a national system of deposit 
insurance.  The CNB also issued regulations under the Banking Act covering capital 
adequacy ratios – 6.25% by the end of 1993 and 8% by 1996.  The credit risk was limited 
to 25% of the bank’s capital.  Banks had to classify loans into five categories with 
reserves being set according to the severity of the bad loan category. 
 
In 1994 and 1995 three banks failed. – Credit and Industrial Bank, AB Bank and 
Bohemia Bank and these failures exhausted the new deposits insurance fund.  More small 
banks failed in 1996, followed by the sixth largest bank failing – Kreditni Banka.  The 
banking sector consolidated with the failures of small and medium sized banks.  The 
State took some control of the country’s newest bank, which reversed any movements 
forward in the privatization process. 
 
In 1994 the Prague Stock Exchange opened.  This followed the first wave of mass 
voucher privatization in 1991, when all adults were permitted to purchase 100 voucher 
points.  Later there was a second wave in 1993.  By 1999 over a thousand joint 
companies had shares traded on the stock exchange, where most of the adult population 
owned shares from the voucher scheme.  Shares also traded on the over the counter 
market where larger sized blocks of trade took place. 
 
Bankruptcy courts were available though much of transition policy aimed at avoiding 
bankruptcies.  The bankruptcy process was backlogged and firms’ managers received 
                                                 
2 Op. Cit. Anderson, R.W. and Kegels, C. 1998, Chapter 6: The Czech Republic   8
increased protection while creditors faced unpredictable consequences.  Generally Czech 
banks were healthy as the NPF gave handouts, and bad loans could be transferred to the 
KOB.  In 1995-1996 when smaller banks failed, the deposit insurance scheme was used 
to fund up to prescribed limits.  When a large bank failed, the State stepped in with 
additional support.  This type of support can prove problematic as the monitoring 
processes set up are not the mechanisms used to check the robustness of individual banks.  
The question of stability of the overall banking system became doubtful.  This 
consolidation undermined public confidence in the banking sector
3.  The Czech 
government introduced the “Stabilisation Programme” which involved the purchase of 
insolvent receivables from banks at their nominal value. 
 
The currency turmoil in 1997 did not have a catastrophic effect on the banking sector, as 
the Czech banks passed on foreign borrowing to domestic companies as foreign exchange 
loans.  The economic recession in 1997-1998 did affect the banking sector as domestic 
firms under-performed and credit risks were exacerbated.  However the banks were not 
also under pressure due to currency risk, and the scope of the crisis was reduced.  By mid 
1998 there was a slowdown in credit growth as banks struggled to clean up their credit 
portfolios and find suitable credit projects.  At the same time there was a major inflow of 
foreign direct investment.  Foreign investors took large interest in domestic companies 
and obtained controlling stakes in them.  This avoided the problem of poor credit 
channels.  This large inflow of foreign investment continued until 2000 and the Czech 
banks provided credit to foreign investors and deposited money with foreign banks.  The 
outflow of money offset any exchange rate impacts of the increased flows of FDI. 
 
By 2001 the Czech Rpublic had thirty eight banks and foreign bank branches
4.  Since 
1989 sixty three licenses had been granted with twenty five terminated by the CNB 
Banking Supervision: seventeen of these because of weak financial condition and non-
compliance with prudential rules.  Since 1998 the majority of banks have been controlled 
by foreign investors and by the end of 2001, they totally dominated the Czech banking 
sector.  Foreign owners held a 70% stake in the total equity capital by 31
st December 
2001, which represented an increase of 15.5% on 2000.  A large share of this (over 50%) 
is concentrated in EU member states.  Concentration in the banking sector increased in 
2001.  The banking sector’s net profit amounted to CZK 17.0 billion which represented 
an increase of 14.4% on 2000, with every bank group recording a profit
5.  Productivity 
and efficiency in the Czech banking sector increased by 21.9% in 2001, resulting from a 
growth in total assets and a reduction in employees.  There was also a decrease in 
operating expenses, a reduction of 0.07% to 2.11% by 31
st December 2001. 
 
In recent years, the banks in the Czech Republic have become more involved in 
derivatives transactions
6.  Since 1994 six building societies have been in operation and 
                                                 
3 Zdenek, Tuna. Czech National Bank, Banking Sector Development in the Czech Republic, November 
2002, http://www.cnb.cz/pdf/tuma_nov_2002.pdf 
4 Czech National Bank, Banking Supervision in 2001, The Banking Sector in 2001, pp2-5  
5 Ibid. Czech National Bank, pp26-27 
6 Ibid. Czech National Bank, pp22   9
are regulated by both the Act on Banks and an additional law regulating building society 
savings schemes
7. 
  
2.1.2.  Hungary 
 
During liberalization in 1989, the size of the banking system in Hungary changed only 
gradually
8.  In June 1990 forty one banks, financial institutions and securities trading 
companies, opened the Budapest Stock Exchange.  By 1991 the State was the largest 
shareholder in the five largest banks.  While there was reduced State involvement in the 
medium-sized commercial banks, they were owned at least partly, by the State.  When 
state owned firms or privately owned firms own shares in banks, generally they receive a 
flow of credit from that bank.  This can lead to reduced credit standards, and explains the 
large amount of problematic loans in Hungary during the 1990’s.  From 1991 onwards, 
there was a dramatic increase in the entry of privately owned and foreign banks.  By the 
end of 1991, trading in Hungarian treasury securities was introduced in the Stock 
Exchange.  In 1992 strengthened banking regulation and a recession led to several 
institutions closing and a reduction in the demand for new licenses, thus reducing the 
number of active institutions.   
 
In December 1992, the New Banking Act, put bank supervision under the State Banking 
Supervision Agency.  The SBSA enforced rules on capital adequacy standards, assets 
classification and provisioning, lending limits and liquidity ratios.  The capital adequacy 
was increased to 8%, though there were exemptions for some, until the end of 1994.  
New standards were imposed for defining loan losses and there was a limit on lending to 
a single customer to a maximum of 25% of the bank’s adjusted capital.  The New 
Banking Act set up the creation of a deposit insurance fund by January 1993.  Also in 
1993 increased foreign interest led to the opening up of new financial institutions.  At the 
end of 1994, only the Hungarian Foreign Trade Bank had been privatised, and then only 
part of it was privatised.  Hungary began to reduce its refinance credits for short-term 
loans, but they remained strong for long term debt.  Credit to enterprises and households 
reduced from almost 41%in 1992 to just over 36% in 1994.  Between 1992 and 1994 the 
State was forced to intervene five times in order to clean up the bad loan problem.  Some 
bad loans were swapped to consolidation bonds, with others being transferred to 
specialised state-owned financial institutions.  Banks with partial foreign owned 
ownership did not suffer from the same extreme of bad loans, and their position was 
generally good over this time period.  The privatization law in 1995 led to the Budapest 
Bank being privatized in 1996.  Stock market activity increased at this time, though it still 
remained underdeveloped.         
 
 
 
In 1997 banking and capital market supervision were brought under one roof.  The Act on 
the HFSA of 1999 established the agency as a national public administration 
organization.  It operated under the direction of the government and was supervised by 
                                                 
7 Ibid. Czech National Bank, pp2 
8 Op. Cit. Anderson, R.W. and Kegels, C. 1998, Chapter 4: Hungary   10
the Minister for Finance.  By 2000 foreign ownership in the financial system was very 
high
9, with foreign intermediaries owning over 70% of the equity capital of banks.   
Government ownership of banks reduced considerably, down to 17%, with plans by the 
government to reduce this even further.  The largest five banks accounted for over 70% 
of household liabilities to households.  Domestic financial intermediation remained low 
by international standards though the recent pace of credit growth deepened 
intermediation.  The HFSA (Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority) was formed due 
to the merger of the Hungarian Bank and Capital Market Supervision, the State Insurance 
Supervision and the State Pension Fund Supervision. 
 
By 2002 the Budapest Stock Exchange rose to a high of 8,397.30.  The Budapest 
Commodities Exchange also operated.  The NBH continued to support initiatives to 
upgrade and develop capital market regulations, and encouraged deepening and increased 
concentration of the domestic government securities market
10.  Supervision of Hungary’s 
capital markets was conducted by the HFSA.  The overall capitalization of the BSE 
increased from eight hundred and eighty four billion forint in 1994 to seven thousand, 
three hundred and six billion forint in 1999
11.  Insurance operations in Hungary were 
governed by Act XCVI on Insurance Institutes and Insurance Activities of 1995 (the 
Insurance Act)
12.  Hungary applied the EU standards on minimum capital and solvency 
margins for both life and non-life insurance. 
 
In 2003 Hungary had one of the most developed banking systems of Central and Eastern 
Europe
13.  Thirty three commercial banks, fourteen specialised institutions and two 
hundred co-operative credit institutions were in operation.  Foreign ownership was high 
in the financial system.  Foreign intermediaries owned over 70% of the equity capital of 
banks.  The government owned only 17% of registered capital and planned to reduce it.  
Concentration remained high in the banking system and competitiveness in the retail 
sector depended on a bank’s branch network.  The largest five banks accounted for over 
70% of bank liabilities to households.  However competition had increased in all business 
segments.   
 
 
2.1.3.  Poland 
 
The Polish banking sector transformed considerably at the end of the 1980’s, and by 1990 
there was the establishment of new banking institutions, created from the National Bank 
of Poland branch network
14.  Nine commercial banks were set up along with a large 
savings bank.  The banking system also comprised several treasury stock commercial 
banks, co-operative agricultural banks, joint-stock commercial banks and ten  
                                                 
9 Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes, International Monetary Fund, Monetary and Exchange 
Affairs, Washington, Hungary April 2001 
10 Monthly Report (includes data up to the end of March 2002), National Bank of Hungary, Statistics 
Department, Summary, Budapest, May 2002, pp20 
11 Op. Cit. Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes, April 2001, pp18 
12 Ibid. pp13-15 
13 Ibid. pp6 
14 Annual Report, Bank Slaski W Katowicach, 1990, pp4-7   11
representative offices of major foreign banks.  While the system was hampered by a lack 
of qualified staff and banking premises, undercapitalisation and a poor 
telecommunications infrastructure, the overall economic climate was in a much improved 
state compared to the proceeding year.  Then, inflation was almost 2000% annually, with 
the budget in deep deficit and the authorities had lost control of credit growth.  In 1990 
the new government launched a successful stabilisation and liberalisation programme.  
The newly decentralized banking system emerged and the Polish authorities, who had 
previously controlled the banking sector, began to remove government accounts from 
balance sheets.  The Polish banking system was governed by the National Bank of Poland 
(31
st January 1989) and the Banking Act (31
st January 1989).  It was regulated and 
supervised by the National Bank of Poland. 
 
By 1991 the government’s tight monetary policy led to reduced credit, which hindered 
banks’ ability to expand and grow
15.  Inflation was high, though reduced to a two digit 
figure.  The whole economy was in a deep recession and recovery took longer than 
expected.  Generally bank profits were low and there was an increase in bad debts.  The 
banking sector became more market oriented and the nine state-owned commercial banks 
were transformed into Treasury joint stock companies.  The Warsaw Stock Exchange 
emerged with nine shares being quoted by the end of the year.  The number of 
independent banks rose and all banks increased their branch network. 
 
1992 saw the introduction of open market transactions, initiated by the central bank
16.  
Treasury bills and inter bank deposits were still the most common form of instruments 
used, with the range of instruments on the Polish money markets still very limited.  The 
number of companies on the Warsaw Stock Exchange increased from nine to sixteen, and 
shares of companies were still the main instrument on the capital market.  Though 
activity increased on the Stock Exchange, it was still small by international standards.  
There was commencement of trading in Treasury notes, and the number of brokerage  
houses, licensed brokers and investor service points increased.  However by 1992, 
licensing of banks had become more restrictive.  New regulations required the minimum 
capital of a bank from twenty to seventy billion zloty, which put pressure on existing 
banks to raise their capital to the new minimum.  A new directive prevented laundering of 
money, and another concerned making provision for bad debts.  Bad debts continued to 
be a problem for banks, while the new requirement for extra provision for bad loans put 
extra pressure on banks. 
 
In 1993 there was a positive change in the economic climate.  Cash resources of 
households increased and zloty deposits of the non-financial sector rose
17.   Bad debts 
were a constant burden to banks.  The Act on Enterprise and Bank Financial 
Restructuring and Changes to Other Laws, came into force.  Bank mergers and take-overs 
of troubled banks took place.  Some co-operative banks were declared insolvent by the 
President of the National Bank of Poland.  Weak banks were put under mandatory 
external management.  The National Bank of Poland finally ceased its commercial 
                                                 
15 Annual Report, Bank Slaski W Katowicach, 1991, pp2-9 
16 Annual Report, Bank Rozwoju Eksporty SA, 1992, pp7-8 
17 Annual Report, Bank W Slaski Katowicach, 1993, pp12-14   12
banking activity.  The Warsaw Stock Exchange began to attract more interest from 
potential customers, as falling interest rates encouraged customers to turn away from 
banking deposits.  The legal framework needed for the Mass Privatisation Programme 
was put in place. 
 
By 1994 economic growth was strengthened and accelerated
18.  Interest rates had 
declined substantially, with overall bank debt rising by 25%.  Bad debts continued to 
increase and reducing inflation led to households increasing their savings.  While gross 
profit was down over 70% for banks, they managed to establish a basis for sustainable 
improvement in their financial standing and loan portfolios.  Banks made consolidation 
agreements, along with co-operatives.  Various strategic alliance and mergers took place 
and the Stock Exchange activity increased initially, followed by a dramatic downturn.  
While the reduction in demand meant a decline of almost 73% in the value of turnover, 
there was recognition that the stock exchange was following a natural state in its 
development. 
 
Banks witnessed stronger growth in 1995.  Loan portfolios grew and improved, and 
financial results were higher than achieved previously
19.  Major restructuring continued 
with weaker banks being taken over by domestic and foreign banks.  Some banks were 
forced out of the market altogether.  The NBP declared bankruptcy of two banks and fifty 
nine co-operative banks.  The Bank Consolidation Act was passed which stated that only 
banks, whose only shareholder was the State Treasury, could be consolidated. 
 
1996 saw economic growth rise by 61%, with consumer prices falling and producer 
prices remaining steady.  The cause of growth was high domestic demand in consumption 
and investment
20.  1997 witnessed economic growth rising to 6.9%, reflecting high 
domestic demand resulting from increased consumer purchasing power and expansion of 
bank loans.  Amendments were made to the Act on the National Bank of Poland and the 
Banking Law, to bring the country closer to EU requirements.  The Monetary Policy 
Council and the Banking Supervision Commission were established, and a new Act on 
Housing Savings and Loans was passed.  This created separate banks for servicing these 
products.  The Act on Mortgage Bonds and Banks was passed in August 1997, which led 
to separate mortgage banks being established with the right to issue mortgage bonds.  The 
process of privatizing the banking sector continued with more and more banks being 
privatized.  Banks began to focus more and more on the retail market as opposed to the 
previous focus on corporate clients.  Branch networks were expanded with four hundred 
new branch offices being opened.  Banks also developed investment banking, and new 
trust fund societies were established.  Interest in commercial papers from the corporate 
sector also grew, with commercial papers being used as a source of financing and for 
investing funds.  Economic growth fostered growth in the banking sector with balance  
sheets growing at almost 30%. 
 
                                                 
18 Annual Report, Bank W Slaski Katowicach, 1994, pp20-21 
19 Annual Report, Bank W Slaski Katowicach, 1995 pp26-27 
20 Annual Report, Bre Bank SA, 1997, pp8-17 
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By 1998 banks’ gross profits fell by 20%, with net profits falling by 36%
21.  The Banking 
Supervision Committee had responded to the Russian crisis and insisted that banks create 
100% provision for Russian exposures.  Higher reserve requirements, falling inflation 
and large investment in new technology and branch networks, led to a deterioration in 
banks’ results.  Foreign ownership of banks increased by 6.5% to 48%, while the State 
Treasury reduced its holdings.  Further privatization of banks took place, and ten banks 
became involved in the creation of pension fund companies.  Two direct banks emerged, 
offering services and products in micro branches to clients, via a limited amount of staff. 
 
The next two years saw improved performance for Poland, with stronger macroeconomic 
fundamentals, steady bank privatization, and an increase in foreign investment in the 
financial sector
22.  Retail banks, both majority Polish owned and foreign owned, 
developed new strategies, increased training of staff, and expanded systems to capture 
new markets.  Privatisation of banks increased, and capital almost doubled.  While this 
figure for capitalization was low by international standards, it represented a major 
increase for Poland.  Banks continued to take on increasing risk though increased 
attention was focused on risky sectors.  Earnings were weaker than before, reflecting 
tightened margins in traditional areas of lending.  Liquidity was strong for banks, and the 
easing of reserve requirements increased the amount available for lending.  Deposits 
continued to be concentrated, with three banks accounting for almost 50% of total 
deposits.  The Warsaw Stock Exchange opened new trading floors, and direct bank 
lending to the state sector declined further.  There was increased harmonization of laws 
and regulations with the Joint Forum on Financial Stability driving the necessary 
changes, to create an environment more conducive to ongoing investment.  Increased 
consolidation of banks took place with more foreign banks entering the market.  Private  
banks expanded with major increases in the retail market.  Overall the banking system 
became more competitive with most banks diversifying.  There were huge gains in 
reducing the electronic and systems gaps that had existed.  Interbank markets functioned 
well, though they remained thin.  Management of banks improved, with high levels of 
public confidence in the overall system. 
 
2001 was a difficult year for Poland generally, with growth slowing considerably
23.  
There was a large deficit in public finance, which seriously eroded the credibility of fiscal 
policy.  There was a reduction in investment which affected all areas of banking.  By 
2002 there were signs of a recovery.  Increased signs of confidence appeared, and private 
consumption increased.  Interest rate cuts helped to increase levels of lending though 
overall activity was sluggish.  The number of commercial banks in Poland reduced from 
seventy one to sixty four, due to consolidations
24, with a resulting loss of commercial 
bank offices (three hundred and thirty one in all since 2001).  Mergers took place 
(Powszechny Bank Kredytowy SA and Bank Przemyslowo-Handlowy SA, and of 
                                                 
21 Annual Report, Bre Bank SA, 1998, pp11-16 
22 An Assessment and Rating of the Polish Banking System 2000, Final Report, USAID Mission to Poland, 
URL:http://www.usaid.gov/pl/2000bank.htm 
23 International Monetary Fund, Article IV Consulation Concluding Statement of the IMF Mission, Poland, 
2002, http://www.imf.org.external/np/ms/2002/031402.htm 
24 National Bank of Poland, Summary Evaluation of the Financial Situation of Polish Banks, General 
Inspectorate of Banking Supervision, First Half 2002, Warsaw, October 2002   14
Pomorski-Kujawsli Bank Regionalny SA and Gospodarczy Bank Wielkopolski SA).   
Two new banks entered the market, MHB Bank Polska SA and Bank of Tokyo-
Mitsubishi (Polska) SA.  Three banks appointed administrators due to a rapid 
deterioration in their financial condition (Bank Spolem SA, Bank Wschnodni SA and 
Wschodni Bank Cukrownictwa SA).  The number of co-operative banks fell from six 
hundred and forty two to six hundred and eight, due to thirty four bank mergers. Banks 
strengthened their market position by developing electronic banking services, and staff 
numbers fell dramatically due to the introduction of new technology and mergers.  The 
financial situation of households deteriorated, which meant the quality of consumer loans 
deteriorated also, leading to a 1.8 point increase in the proportion of these loans being 
classified as irregular. 
 
By 2003 Poland continued to abstain from the foreign exchange market.  This meant that 
Poland did not suffer from volatile market expectations.  In the banking system credit 
growth remained slow with, with classified loans remaining high and profits low.   
Problem loan growth had fallen, with capital adequacy ratios for most banks remaining 
high.  A new bankruptcy law was introduced and increased privatization took place, 
though scope remained for further privatization. 
 
3.0 Empirical  Estimate  of  the Theoretical Relationship between Financial 
Deregulation/Development and Economic Growth    
     
Numerous studies have examined the relationship between financial liberalization and 
economic growth.  Kar and Pentecost
25 studied economic growth in Turkey and found 
that the different variables used, affected results.  With the money to income ratio, 
causality ran from financial development to economic growth while with bank deposits, 
causality ran in the opposite direction – from economic growth to financial development.  
Using private credit and domestic credit, causality also ran from economic growth to 
financial development.  Calderon and Liu
26 examined one hundred and nine developing 
and industrial countries
27 over three decades and found bi-directional causality between 
                                                 
25 Kar, Mushin. And Pentecost, Erick. J. “Financial Development and Economic Growth in Turkey: further 
evidence on the causality issue”, Economic Research Paper No. 00/27, Loughborough University, 
Department of Economics, December 2000 
26 Calderon, Cesar. And Liu, Lin. “The Direction of Causality between Financial Development and 
Economic Growth”, Central Bank of Chile Working Papers, No 184, October 2002 
27 Argentina, Australia, Austria, Barbados, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Mauritius, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuala, Algeria, 
Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Barundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central 
Africa, Chad, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cote dIvoire, Cyprus, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, The Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, HAITI, Honduras, 
India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, Korea, Republic Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Malta, 
Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, 
Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, 
Singapore, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Syrian Arab, Republic Tanzania, 
Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe     15
financial development and economic growth.  They also saw that the impact of financial 
development on economic growth is more positive the longer the time period studied,  
which indicates that it takes time for financial deepening to affect the real sector. 
 
Oks
28 looked at ten countries
29 and found mixed results: four out of ten countries 
indicated a relationship with causality running from financial development to economic 
growth (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia and Poland).  McLean and Shrestha
30 studied 
forty developing/developed countries
31 and conclude that foreign direct investment and 
portfolio flows affect economic growth positively, while bank inflows have a negative 
effect on economic growth.  Aziakpono
32 found mixed results in studies of Botswana, 
Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland.  These countries form the Southern 
Africa Custom Union (RAND) Common Monetary Area.  South Africa had causality 
running from financial intermediation to economic growth, but in the other four 
countries, causality ran from growth to financial development.  Demetriades and Law
33 
discovered, in their studies of seventy two countries over two decades
34, that a sound 
institutional framework was needed in order for financial systems to operate.  A 
framework such as this allowed financial development to affect growth positively, while 
the absence of it could easily lead to a failure of growth. 
 
Darrat
35 examined Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates and found that 
financial deepening is a necessary causal factor of economic growth.  Andreisz et al
36 
studied Poland over eleven years and found a long run positive relationship between 
financial liberalization and economic growth, and causality between the two variables 
running from the former to the latter. 
 
                                                 
28 Oks, Andrus. “Efficiency of the Financial Intermediaries and Economic Growth in CEEC”, University of 
Tartu, Faculty of Economic and Business Administration, Tartu, 2001 
29 Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia 
30 Op. Cit. Abstract, ppi 
31 Argentina, Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Columbia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Thailand, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zimbabwe 
32 Aziakpono, Meshach. “Financial Intermediation and Economic Growth in Economic Integration: the 
Case of SACU”, National University of Lesotho, Department of Economics 
33 Demetriades, Panicos and Law. Siong Hook. “Finance, Institutions and Economic Growth”, University 
of Leicester, Working Paper, No 04/05, February 2003 
34 High Income: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, 
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States.  Middle Income: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Cyprus, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Iran, Jamaica, Korea, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama., Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, South Africa, Syria, Uruguay.  
Low Income: Algeria, Bangladesh, Cameroon, Egypt, Gambia, Ghana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, 
Kenya, Malawi, Niger, Pakistan, Philippines, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, 
Tunisia, Zimbabwe, Zambia 
35 Op. Cit. Darrat, Ali. F. 1999 
36 Andreisz, Ewa et al, “The Linkage between Financial Liberalisation and Economic Development: 
Empirical Evidence from Poland”, Discussion Paper Series, No 03/03, City University, Department of 
Economics, School of Social Sciences, abstract   16
Stock market liberalization was also found in increase economic growth – see Bekaert et 
al
37 for a positive relationship in Japan, Iceland, Malta, New Zealand and Spain.   
Caporale et al
38 found the same result in the long run for Argentina, Chile, Greece, 
Korea, Malaysia, Philippines and Portugal.  Choong et al
39 found a long-run positive 
impact on economic growth when they studied stock market development in Malaysia, 
and that it also caused economic growth.  Filer et al
40 found the same results especially 
for less developed countries.  In their study sixty nine countries
41 were examined: high 
income, upper middle, low middle and low income countries. 
 
 
4.0 Empirical  Evidence  of  the Theoretical Relationship between Financial 
Deregulation/Development and Economic Growth in the Czech Republic, Hungary 
and Poland, for years 1990-2003 
 
To date there is no comprehensive study of these three countries over this time period, of 
the relationship between financial deregulation and economic growth.  Oks addresses it to 
some extent in his 2001 works
42, though his time frame for all countries is short: the 
Czech Republic is covered for years 1993-1999, Hungary 1992-1999 and Poland 1992-
1999.  Here the study is extended to cover years up to 2003, and open economy effects 
are used – imports and exports.  Andriesz et al
43 examine Poland and find positive results 
with financial liberalization causing economic growth.  The data sample used here is 
followed and this study also follow Gupta
44 by using industrial production as a proxy for 
economic growth.  The following variables are used: M0, M2, Ratio of Credit to the 
Private Sector to Industrial Production, Three Month Treasury Bill Rate, Credit to Non-
Financial Sector, Credit to Government, Domestic Deposits of Non-Financial Sector in 
Commercial Banks, Domestic Deposits of Non-Financial Sector in Central Bank and 
Commercial Banks.  In line with Oks the interest rate spread is examined and like Darrat 
nominal GDP is used (with the investigation into the openness to trade variable: the ratio 
of exports and imports to nominal GDP).  There is also an examination of the ratio of bad 
                                                 
37 Bekaert, Geert. Harvey, Cambell, R. and Lundblad, Christian. “Does Financial Liberalisation Spur 
Growth”, NEBR Working Paper, No 245, 2001 
38 Caporale, Gugielmo Maria et al, “Stock Market Development and Economic Growth: the Causal 
Linkage”, Journal of Economic Development, Vol 29, No 1, June 2003, pp33 
39 Choong, Chee et al, “Financial Development and Economic Growth in Malaysia: the Stock Market 
Perspective”, 2003, Economic Working Paper Archive at WUSTL - Macroeconomics 
40 Filer, Randall. K et al, “Do Stock Markets Promote Economic Growth?”, Working Paper No. 267, 
September 1999 
41 High Income: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States, Cyprus, Greece, Israel, Korea, Portugal.  Upper Middle 
Income: Argentina, Botswana, Brazil, Chile, Czech Republic, Hungary, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, 
Oman, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Slovakia, South Africa, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela 
Uruguay.  Low Middle and Low Income: Bangladesh, China, Columbia, Ecuador, Egypt, India, Indonesia, 
Iran, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Morocco, Namibia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines,  
Sri Lanka, Thailand, Tunisia, Zimbabwe. 
42 Op. Cit. 2001 
43 Op. Cit. 2003 
44 Op. Cit. 1984   17
loans to overall lending by banks, and the focus is on banking development as opposed to 
stock market development. 
 
4.1  Data and Methodology 
 
All data was taken from the EU Commission
45, Central Bank Annual Reports for the 
three countries, Annual Reports from various banks, Information Bulletins, the  
International Monetary Fund
46, Abel et al
47, and Anderson et al
48.  The Dickey Fuller 
(DF) and Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) tests were used to implement stationarity 
tests.  The investigation of the relationship between financial development and economic 
growth used techniques of cointegration and Granger causality.  Error correction models 
were used.  Here the F-statistic is established, for testing the joint null hypothesis that the 
coefficiencts of these level variables are zero i.e. there exists no long-run relationship 
between them. 
 
Variables were selected for the following reasons: 
 
a)  Amount of bad loans, to measure the effectiveness of the banking sector from 
1990-2003 
 
b)  Quarterly Industrial Production (seasonally adjusted) is used as a proxy for 
economic growth.  Data is provided from Quarter 1 1993 to Quarter 4 2003 for the Czech 
Republic, Quarter 1 1990 to Quarter 4 2003 for both Hungary and Poland 
 
c)  Two different definitions of money are used: M0 and M2 to measure the 
monetary effects of financial liberalization.  A higher ratio of M2 to industrial production 
implies greater financial intermediary development.  Data is provided for both variables 
from Quarter 1 1993 to Quarter 4 2003 for the Czech Republic, for Quarter 1 1993 to 
Quarter 4 2003 for M0 and quarter 4 1990 to Quarter 4 2003 for M2 in Hungary, and 
Quarter 1 1990 to Quarter 3 2003 for both variables for Poland. 
 
d)  Credit to the Private Sector to Domestic Credit, measures the magnitude of the 
banking sector.  The supply of credit to the private banking sector is viewed as being  
responsible for the quantity and quality of investment, and for economic growth.  Data 
from Quarter 1 1993 to Quarter 2003 for the Czech Republic, and from Quarter 1 1990 to 
Quarter 4 2003 for both Hungary and Poland is used. 
e)  Three Month Treasury Bill Interest Rate as a ratio of Industrial Production.  Data 
from Quarter 3 1993 to Quarter 4 2003 for the Czech Republic, Quarter 1 1990 to Quarter 
4 2003 for Hungary, and from Quarter 2 1992 to Quarter 4 2003 for Poland is used. 
 
                                                 
45 http://www.europa.eu.int 
46 http://www.imfstatistics.org 
47 Abel, I. Siklos. And Szekely, P. I., Money and Financial in the Transition to a Market Economy, 
Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 1998 
48 Anderson, R.A. and Kegela, C. Transition Banking, Financial Development of Central and Eastern 
Europe, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1998   18
f)  Credit to Government to Overall Credit indicates the amount available for 
government investment.  Data ranges from Quarter 1 1993 to Quarter 4 2003 in the Czech 
Republic, Quarter 1 1990 to Quarter 4 2003 for both Hungary and Poland. 
 
g)  The Ratio of Domestic Credit issued by deposit banks, to Domestic Credit issued 
by Deposit Banks and the Central Bank, measures the role of the central bank in lending 
activities.  A lower amount of loans issued by the Central Bank is deemed as preferable, 
as commercial banks are assumed to be able to select higher return projects.  Data for 
both variables from Quarter 1 1993 to Quarter 4 2003 in the Czech Republic, and for both 
variables from Quarter 1 1990 to Quarter 4 2003 for both Hungary and Poland is used. 
 
h)  Interest Rate Spread - measures the amount of reserves absorbed by the banking 
sector.  Data ranges from Quarter 1 1993 to Quarter 4 2003 in the Czech Republic, from 
Quarter 1 1990 to Quarter 4 2003 in both Hungary and Poland. 
 
i)  Ratio of Total Exports and Imports measures the openness to trade variable.  Data 
covers Quarter 1 1991 to Quarter 4 2003 for exports and imports in the Czech Republic.  
In Hungary data ranges from Quarter 1 1990 to Quarter 4 2003, and for Poland exports 
and imports are covered from Quarter 1 1990 to Quarter 4 2003. 
 
4.2  Findings 
4.2.1  Unit Root Tests and Engle-Granger Cointegration Tests Results 
 
We apply the Dickey Fuller (DF) and Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) tests, and assume 
lag length 4.  The results are presented in tables 2.5 to 2,6 at log levels and first 
differences, with a trend for log level and without trend for first difference.  There is a 
check that the logarithmic levels contain a unit root, before checking first difference. 
 
Dickey Fuller and Augmented Dickey Fuller Test Results 
Unit Root Tests at Levels for the Czech Republic 
Unit Root Tests at Logarithmic Levels 
Variables 
  *Evidence of unit root at 5% significance level – the null hypothesis cannot be 
rejected 
  *95% Critical Values for the Augmented Dickey Fuller statistic = -3.5279 (with 
trend) and -2.9400 (without trend) 
 
 
Table 2.5 
  With Trend  Without Trend 
Industrial Production    
DF                          -.67832*     
ADF(1)                  -.81202*     
ADF(2)                  -.75398*     
ADF(3)                  -.46215*     
ADF(4)                  -.10927*       19
M0    
ADF(2)                  -.11795*     
ADF(3)                  -.27692*       
ADF(4)                  -1.2132*     
M2    
DF                         -2.0177*     
ADF(1)                 -1.6082*     
ADF(2)                 -1.9596*      
ADF(3)                 -1.9570*     
ADF(4)                 -2.6900*     
Credit to Private Sector    
DF                        -2.1796*     
ADF(1)                -2.1170*     
ADF(2)                -2.3330*     
ADF(3)                -2.2559*     
ADF(4)                -1.9148*     
Three Month Treasury 
Bill Rate 
  
DF                       -2.2736*     
ADF(1)               -2.3753*                           
ADF(2)               -2.4559*         
ADF(3)                -2.3344*       
ADF(4)                -2.2060*      
Credit to Non-Financial 
Sector 
  
DF                        -2.3494*     
ADF(1)                -2.2636*     
ADF(2)                -2.4338*     
ADF(3)                -2.3667*     
ADF(4)                -2.0554*     
Credit to Government    
DF                        -.71845*     
Deposits of Non-Financial 
Sector in Commercial 
Banks 
  
DF                         -2.1422*     
ADF(1)                 -1.5535*     
ADF(2)                 -1.8430*     
ADF(3)                 -1.9022*      
ADF(4)                 -2.3102*       
Deposits of Non-Financial 
Sector in the Central 
Bank and Commercial 
Banks 
  
DF                         -2.0073*       20
ADF(1)                 -1.5791*     
ADF(2)                 -2.0622*     
ADF(3)                 -2.2167*     
ADF(4)                 -2.5267*     
Interest Rate Spread    
DF                         -1.1793*       
ADF(1)                 -1.1467*     
ADF(2)                 -.92327*     
ADF(3)                 -.84417*     
ADF(4)                 -1.1513*     
Exports and Imports    
ADF(1)                 -2.1599*     
ADF(3)                 -2.7412*      
  
 
Table 2.6 
  Unit Root Tests at First Difference 
  Industrial Production 
  ADF(4)                                          -2.3403* 
 M0 
  ADF(2)                                          -2.5988* 
  ADF(3)                                          -1.6831* 
  ADF(4)                                          -1.8933* 
 M2 
  ADF(3)                                          -2.1120 
  ADF(4)                                          -2.1632* 
  Credit to Private Sector 
  ADF(1)                                          -1.9919* 
  ADF(2)                                          -1.8555* 
  ADF(3)                                          -2.0555* 
  ADF(4)                                          -1.7249* 
  Three Month Treasury Bill Rate 
  ADF(4)                                          -2.8514* 
  Credit To Non-Financial Sector 
  ADF(1)                                          -2.0071* 
  ADF(2)                                          -1.8665* 
  ADF(3)                                          -2.0838*  
  ADF(4)                                          -1.8169* 
  Credit to Government 
  ADF(2)                                          -2.3423* 
  ADF(3)                                          -2.1842* 
  ADF(4)                                          -1.5626* 
  Deposits of Non-Financial Sector in 
Commercial Banks 
  ADF(3)                                          -2.5013*   21
  ADF(4)                                          -2.1419* 
  Deposits of Non-Financial Sector in 
Central Bank and Commercial Banks 
  ADF(2)                                          -2.8849* 
  ADF(3)                                          -2.4067* 
  ADF(4)                                          -2.2046* 
  Interest Rate Spread 
  ADF(3)                                          -2.6914* 
  ADF(4)                                          -2.1995*  
  Exports and Imports 
  ADF(3)                                          -2.4742* 
*Evidence of unit root at the 5% significance level – the null hypothesis cannot be 
rejected,  *95% Critical Values for the Augmented Dickey Fuller Statistic = -3.5279 
(with trend), and -2.9400 (without trend)   123 (Volume 1) 
There is evidence of unit root at levels for all variables: Industrial Production, M0, M2, 
Credit to Private Sector, Three Month Treasury Bill Rate, Credit to Non-Financial Sector, 
Credit to Government, Deposits of Non-Financial Sector in Commercial Banks, Deposits 
of Non-Financial Sector in the Central Bank and Commercial Banks, Interest Rate 
Spread, Exports and Imports, and for first difference for all variables for the Czech 
Republic. 
 
Dickey Fuller and Augmented Dickey Fuller Results 
Unit Root Tests at Levels for Hungary 
 
*Evidence of unit root at the 5% significance level – the null hypothesis cannot be 
rejected 
*95% Critical Value for the Augmented Dickey Fuller statistics = -3.4987 (with trend), 
and -2.9202 (without trend) 
 
Unit Root Tests at Logarithmic Levels 
Variables 
Table 2.7 
  With Trend  Without Trend 
Industrial Production    
ADF(1) -3.4034*   
ADF(2) -3.4057*   
ADF(3) -3.3710*   
(ADF4) -3.4675*   
M0    
DF -.73454*   
ADF(1) -.0049224*   
ADF(2) -.018447*   
ADF(3) -.18809*   
ADF(4) -1.2132*   
M2    
DF -.34238*     22
Credit to Private Sector    
DF -2.1133*   
ADF(1) -2.0820*   
ADF(2) -2.2496*   
ADF(3) -2.0290*   
ADF(4) -2.0257*   
Three Month Treasury 
Bill Rate 
  
DF -1.6551*   
ADF(1) -2.9499*   
ADF(2) -2.9739*   
ADF(4) -3.0868*   
Credit to Non Financial 
Sector 
  
DF -2.5748*   
ADF(1) -2.1402*   
ADF(2) -2.5096*   
ADF(3) -2.0257*   
ADF(4) -2.1119*   
Credit to Government     
DF -1.4076*   
ADF(1) -1.3918*   
ADF(2) -1.3928*   
ADF(3) -1.2572*   
ADF(4) -1.3063*   
Deposits of Non Financial 
Sector in Commercial 
Banks 
  
DF -.50832*   
ADF(1) -4.036*  
Deposits of Non Financial 
Sector in the Central 
Bank and Commercial 
Banks 
  
DF -.50884*   
ADF(1) -.018340*   
Interest Rate Spread    
DF -2.1469*   
ADF(2) -3.0027*   
ADF(3) -2.7350*   
ADF(4) -2.5323*   
Exports and Imports    
ADF(1) -2.1599*   
ADF(3) -2.7412*   
   23
Unit Root Tests at First Difference 
Table 2.8 
  Industrial Production 
  ADF(4)                                           -2.0343*
  M0 
  ADF(2)                                           -2.5988*
  ADF(3)                                           -1.6831*
  ADF(4)                                           -1.8933*
  M2 
  ADF(3)                                           -2.1120*
  ADF(4)                                           -2.1632*
  Credit to Private Sector 
  ADF(1)                                           -1.8594*
  ADF(2)                                           -.30548*
  Three Month Treasury Bill Rate 
  ADF(4)                                           -2.7514*
  Credit to Non Financial Sector 
  ADF(1)                                           -2.0071*
  ADF(2)                                           -1.8665*
  ADF(3)                                           -2.0838*
  ADF(4)                                           -1.8169*
  Credit to Government 
  ADF(1)                                           -2.3640*
  ADF(2)                                           -2.4238*
  ADF(3)                                           -2.1982* 
  ADF(4)                                           -2.1150* 
  Deposits of Non Financial Sector in 
Commercial Banks  
  ADF(3)                                           -1.3782* 
  ADF(4)                                           -1.1021* 
  Deposits of Non Financial Sector in 
Central Bank and Commercial Banks 
  ADF(3)                                           -1.3676*
  ADF(4)                                           -1.1644*
  Interest Rate Spread 
  ADF(3)                                           -2.6914*
  ADF(4)                                           -2.1995*
  Exports and Imports 
  DF                                                  -2.3713* 
  ADF(1)                                           -1.9973*
  ADF(2)                                           -2.2437*
  ADF(3)                                           -2.0041*
  ADF(4)                                           -2.4389* 
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*Evidence of unit root at the 5% significance level–the null hypothesis cannot be rejected 
*95% Critical Value for the Augmented Dickey-Fuller Statistic = -3.5279 (with trend), 
and -2.9400 (without trend) 
 
There is evidence of unit root at levels for variables: Industrial Production, M0, M2, 
Credit to Private Sector, Three Month Treasury Bill Rate, Credit to Non Financial Sector, 
Credit to Government, Deposits of Non Financial Sector in Commercial Banks, Deposits 
of Non Financial Sector in Central Bank and Commercial Banks, Interest Rate Spread, 
Exports and Imports, and for first difference for all variable for Hungary. 
 
Dickey Fuller and Augmented Dickey Fuller Results 
Unit Root Tests at Levels for Poland 
*Evidence of unit root at the 5% significance level – the null hypothesis cannot be 
rejected 
*95% Critical Value for the Augmented Dickey Fuller statistics = -3.4987 (with trend), 
and -2.9202 (without trend) 
 
Unit Root Tests at Logarithmic Levels 
Variables 
Table 2.9 
  With Trend  Without Trend 
Industrial Production     
DF -2.5611*   
ADF(1) -2.8992*   
ADF(2) -3.1024*   
ADF(3) -2.8577*   
ADF(4) -2.3713*   
M0    
DF -1.0462*   
ADF(1) -.90151*   
ADF(2) -1.3878*   
ADF(3) -2.5550*   
ADF(4) -1.4797*   
M2    
DF -2.0176*   
ADF(1) -1.9865*   
ADF(2) -2.0883*   
ADF(3) -2.3171*   
ADF(4) -2.4956*   
Credit to Private Sector    
ADF(4) -3.3954*   
Three Month Treasury 
Bill Rate 
  
DF -1.4976*   
ADF(1) -2.1579*   
ADF(1) -1.8062*     25
ADF(3) -1.5170*   
ADF(4) -1.2177*   
Credit to Non Financial 
Sector 
  
DF -2.1876*   
ADF(1) -2.1111*   
ADF(2) -2.0398*   
ADF(3) -2.1783*   
ADF(4) -2.4490*   
Credit to Government     
DF -2.2956*   
ADF(1) -2.0570*   
ADF(2) -2.1591*   
ADF(3) -1.9655*   
ADF(4) -1.9003*   
Deposits of Non Financial 
Sector in Commercial 
Banks 
  
DF -2.9671*   
ADF(1) -2.1271*   
ADF(2) -1.9833*   
ADF(3) -1.9617*   
ADF(4) -1.9619*   
Deposits of Non Financial 
Sector in Central Bank 
and Commercial Banks 
  
DF -1.7566*   
ADF(1) -1.7857*   
ADF(2) -2.0411*   
ADF(3) -2.3013*   
ADF(4) -2.5799*   
Interest Rate Spread     
DF -2.4900*   
ADF(1) -2.4576*   
ADF(2) -1.3214*   
ADF(3) -1.2292*   
ADF(4) -1.7500*   
Exports and Imports     
DF -2.2561*   
 
ADF(1) 
               
-1.5676* 
 
ADF(2) -1.6121*   
ADF(3) -1.3012*   
ADF(4) -2.0472*   
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Table 2.10 
  Unit Root at First Difference 
  M0                                                 
  ADF(1)                                         -2.8080* 
  ADF(2)                                         -1.1246* 
  ADF(3)                                         -2.2053* 
  ADF(4)                                         -2.2283*  
  M2 
  ADF(2)                                         -2.3504* 
  ADF(3)                                         -1.9548*  
  ADF(4)                                         -2.0751* 
  Three Month Treasury Bill Rate 
  DF                                                 -2.9505* 
  ADF(4)                                         -2.8032* 
  Credit to Non Financial Sector 
  ADF(2)                                         -2.0449*  
  ADF(3)                                         -1.6407* 
  ADF(4)                                         -1.1983* 
  Credit to Government 
  ADF(4)                                         -2.1242* 
  Deposits of Non Financial Sector in 
Commercial Banks 
  ADF(4)                                         -2.4534* 
  Deposits of Non Financial Sector in 
Central Bank and Commercial Banks 
  ADF(2)                                        -2.3869* 
  ADF(3)                                        -1.8728* 
  ADF(4)                                        -1.8663* 
  Exports and Imports 
  ADF(3)                                        -1.3824* 
  ADF(4)                                        -1.7146* 
*Evidence of unit root at the 5% significance level – the null hypothesis cannot rejected 
*95% Critical Value for the Augmented Dickey Fuller Statistic = -3.5279 (with trend), 
and -2.9400 (without trend) 
 
There is evidence of unit root at levels for all variables: Industrial Production, M0, M2, 
Credit to Private Sector, Three Month Treasury Bill Rate, Credit to Non Financial Sector,  
Credit to Government, Deposits of Non Financial Sector in Commercial Banks, Deposits  
of Non Financial Sector in Central Bank and Commercial Banks, Interest Rate Spread, 
Exports and Imports, and for variables M0, M2, Three Month Treasury Bill Rate, Credit 
to Non Financial Sector, Credit to Government, Deposits of Non Financial Sector in 
Commercial Banks, Deposits of Non Financial Sector in Central Bank and Commercial 
Banks, and Exports and Imports for first differences for Poland. 
   27
Cointegration tests can be performed for all three countries, to test the long run 
relationship between variables. 
 
4.2.2  Johansen-Juselius Maximum Likelihood Cointegration Tests 
 
Johansen Maximum Likelihood Procedure 
Testing for Cointegration between Industrial Production and other Financial 
Development Indicators for the Czech Republic 
 
Variables 
*rejection of the null hypothesis, that there is no cointegration between variables (that  
R = 0) but does not reject that there is a cointegration relation between two variables  
(R = 1) 
 
Table 2.11 
Cointegration LR Test based on Maximum Eigenvalue of the Stochastic Matrix 
M0 Statistic  Order of VAR  Null  95% Critical Value 
20.0036*  1  R = 0  15.8700 
8.1833*  1  R <= 1  9.1600 
28.2169*  1  R = 0  20.1800 
8.1833*  1  R <= 1  9.1600 
 
 
Table 2.12 
Cointegration LR Test based on Maximum Eigenvalue of the Stochastic Matrix 
M2 Statistic  Order of VAR  Null  95% Critical Value 
29.8048*  1  R = 0  15.8700 
6.9330*  1  R <= 1  9.1600 
36.7738*  1  R = 0  20.1800 
6.9330*  1  R <= 1  9.1600 
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Table 2.13 
Cointegration LR Test based on Maximum Eigenvalue of the Stochastic Matrix 
CRPR Statistic  Order of VAR  Null  95% Critical Value 
9.1122  1  R = 0  15.8700 
4.1296  1  R <= 1  9.1600 
13.2418  1  R = 0  20.1800 
4.1296  1  R <= 1  9.1600 
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Table 2.14 
Cointegration LR Test based on Maximum Eigenvalue of the Stochastic Matrix 
TRS Statistic  Order of VAR  Null  95% Critical Value 
14.7827  1  R = 0  15.8700 
1.8227  1  R <= 1  9.1600 
16.6054  1  R = 0  20.1800 
1.8227  1  R <= 1  9.1600 
 
 
 
Table 2.15 
Cointegration LR Test based on Maximum Eigenvalue of the Stochastic Matrix 
CRNF Statistic  Order of VAR  Null  95% Critical Value 
6.9109  1  R = 0  15.8700 
5.0915  1  R <= 1  9.1600 
12.0023  1  R = 0  20.1800 
5.0915  1  R <= 1  9.1600 
 
 
 
Table 2.16 
Cointegration LR Test based on Maximum Eigenvalue of the Stochastic Matrix 
CRG Statistic  Order of VAR  Null  95% Critical Value 
18.4449*  1  R = 0  15.8700 
4.5373*  1  R <= 1  9.1600 
22.9822*  1  R = 0  20.1800 
4.5373*  1  R <= 1  9.1600 
 
 
Table 2.17 
Cointegration LR Test based on Maximum Eigenvalue of the Stochastic Matrix 
DPC Statistic  Order of VAR  Null  95% Critical Value 
19.0987*  1  R = 0  15.8700 
6.8767*  1  R <= 1  9.1600 
26.9665*  1  R = 0  20.1800 
6.8767*  1  R <= 1  9.1600 
 
 
Table 2.18 
Cointegration LR Test based on Maximum Eigenvalue of the Stochastic Matrix 
DPCC Statistic  Order of VAR  Null  95% Critical Value 
21.2041*  1  R = 0  15.8700 
7.3534*  1  R <= 1  9.1600 
28.5575*  1  R = 0  20.1800 
7.3534*  1  R <= 1  9.1600   29
Table 2.19 
Cointegration LR Test based on Maximum Eigenvalue of the Stochastic Matrix 
SPR Statistic  Order of VAR  Null  95% Critical Value 
10.3026  1  R = 0  15.8700 
4.9764  1  R <= 1  9.1600 
15.2790  1  R = 0  20.1800 
4.9764  1  R <= 1  9.1600 
 
 
Table 2.20 
Cointegration LR Test based on Maximum Eigenvalue of the Stochastic Matrix 
EXIMP Statistic  Order of VAR  Null  95% Critical Value 
19.0882*  1  R = 0  15.8700 
9.1577  1  R <= 1  9.1600 
28.6058*  1  R = 0  20.1800 
9.1577  1  R <= 1  9.1600 
 
For the Czech Republic, the Maximum Eigenvalue and Trace Eigenvalue statistics both 
strongly reject the null hypothesis that there is no cointegration between Industrial 
Production and M0/M2/Credit to Government/Deposits of Non Financial Sector in 
Commercial Banks/Deposits of Non Financial Sector in Central Bank and Commercial 
Banks/Exports and Imports but do not reject that there is one cointegration relation 
between the two variables.  The conclusion is that causation exists in at least one 
direction. 
 
Johansen Maximum Likelihood Procedure 
Testing for Cointegration between Industrial Production and other Financial 
Development Indicators for Hungary 
Variables 
*rejection of the null hypothesis, that there is no cointegration between variables (that  
R = 0) but does not reject that there is a cointegration relation between two variables  
(R = 1) 
 
 
Table 2.21 
Cointegration LR Test based on Maximum Eigenvalue of the Stochastic Matrix 
M0 Statistic  Order of VAR  Null  95% Critical Value 
45.7772*  1  R = 0  15.8700 
2.5157*  1  R <= 1  9.1600 
48.2929*  1  R = 0  17.8800 
2.5157*  1  R <= 1  9.1600 
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Table 2.22 
Cointegration LR Test based on Maximum Eigenvalue of the Stochastic Matrix 
M2 Statistic  Order of VAR  Null  95% Critical Value 
93.3508*  1  R = 0  15.8700 
5.4410*  1  R <= 1  9.1600 
98.7918*  1  R = 0  20.1800 
5.4400*  1  R <= 1  9.1600 
 
 
 
Table 2.23 
Cointegration LR Test based on Maximum Eigenvalue of the Stochastic Matrix 
CRPR Statistic  Order of VAR  Null  95% Critical Value 
34.3063*  1  R = 0  15.8700 
1.4281*  1  R <= 1  9.1600 
35.7334*  1  R = 0  20.1800 
1.4281*  1  R <= 1  9.1600 
 
 
 
Table 2.24 
Cointegration LR Test based on Maximum Eigenvalue of the Stochastic Matrix 
TRS Statistic  Order of VAR  Null  95% Critical Value 
12.4237  1  R = 0  15.8700 
3.5100  1  R <= 1  9.1600 
15.9337  1  R = 0  20.1800 
3.5100  1  R <= 1  9.1600 
 
 
Table 2.25 
Cointegration LR Test based on Maximum Eigenvalue of the Stochastic Matrix 
CRNF Statistic  Order of VAR  Null  95% Critical Value 
31.0762*  1  R = 0  15.8700 
1.4753*  1  R <= 1  9.1600 
32.5515*  1  R = 0  20.1800 
1.4753*  1  R <= 1  9.1600 
 
 
Table 2.26 
Cointegration LR Test based on Maximum Eigenvalue of the Stochastic Matrix 
CRG Statistic  Order of VAR  Null  95% Critical Value 
14.6107  1  R = 0  15.8700 
7.9630  1  R <= 1  9.1600 
22.5737*  1  R = 0  20.1800 
7.9630*  1  R <= 1  9.1600   31
Table 2.27 
Cointegration LR Test based on Maximum Eigenvalue of the Stochastic Matrix 
DPC Statistic  Order of VAR  Null  95% Critical Value 
86.2979*  1  R = 0  15.8700 
20.7502  1  R <= 1  9.1600 
107.0481*  1  R = 0  20.1800 
20.7502  1  R <= 1  9.1600 
 
Table 2.28 
Cointegration LR Test based on Maximum Eigenvalue of the Stochastic Matrix 
DPCC Statistic  Order of VAR  Null  95% Critical Value 
86.3837*  1  R = 0  15.8700 
30.4833  1  R <= 1  9.1600 
107.2270*  1  R = 0  20.1800 
20.8433  1  R <= 1  9.1600 
 
Table 2.29 
Cointegration LR Test based on Maximum Eigenvalue of the Stochastic Matrix 
SPR Statistic  Order of VAR  Null  95% Critical Value 
9.0916  1  R = 0  15.8700 
2.3448  1  R <= 1  9.1600 
11.3644  1  R = 0  20.1800 
2.3488  1  R <= 1  9.1600 
 
Table 2.30 
Cointegration LR Test based on Maximum Eigenvalue of the Stochastic Matrix 
CRPR Statistic  Order of VAR  Null  95% Critical Value 
25.1051*  1  R = 0  15.8700 
12.6913  1  R <= 1  9.1600 
37.7964  1  R = 0  20.1800 
12.6913  1  R <= 1  9.1600 
 
For Hungary, the Maximum Eigenvalue and Trace Eigenvalue statistics both strongly 
reject the null hypothesis that there is no cointegration between Industrial Production and 
M0/M2/Credit to the Private Sector/ Credit to the Non Financial Sector/Credit to  
Government – Trace Eigenvalue only/Deposits of Non Financial Sector in Commercial 
Banks/Deposits of Non Financial Sector in Central Bank and Commercial Banks/Exports 
and Imports but do not reject that there is one cointegration relation between the two 
variables.  The conclusion is that causation exists in at least one direction. 
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Johansen Maximum Likelihood Procedure 
Testing for Cointegration between Industrial Production and other Financial 
Development Indicators for Poland 
 
Variables 
*rejection of the null hypothesis, that there is no cointegration between variables (that  
R = 0) but does not reject that there is a cointegration relation between two variables  
(R = 1) 
 
Table 2.31 
Cointegration LR Test based on Maximum Eigenvalue of the Stochastic Matrix 
M0 Statistic  Order of VAR  Null  95% Critical Value 
16.0773*  1  R = 0  15.8700 
3.8212*  1  R <= 1  9.1600 
19.8985  1  R = 0  20.1800 
3.8212  1  R <= 1  9.1600 
 
 
 
Table 2.32 
Cointegration LR Test based on Maximum Eigenvalue of the Stochastic Matrix 
M2 Statistic  Order of VAR  Null  95% Critical Value 
43.5182*  1  R = 0  15.8700 
6.6093*  1  R <= 1  9.1600 
50.1276*  1  R = 0  20.1800 
6.6093*  1  R <= 1  9.1600 
 
 
Johansen Maximum Likelihood Procedure 
Testing for Cointegration between Industrial Production and other Financial 
Development Indicators for Hungary 
 
Variables 
*rejection of the null hypothesis, that there is no cointegration between variables (that  
R = 0) but does not reject that there is a cointegration relation between two variables  
(R = 1) 
 
 
Table 2.33 
Cointegration LR Test based on Maximum Eigenvalue of the Stochastic Matrix 
CRPR Statistic  Order of VAR  Null  95% Critical Value 
34.6995*  1  R = 0  15.8700 
.97612*  1  R <= 1  9.1600 
35.6646*  1  R = 0  20.1800 
.97612*  1  R <= 1  9.1600 
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Table 2.34 
Cointegration LR Test based on Maximum Eigenvalue of the Stochastic Matrix 
TRS Statistic  Order of VAR  Null  95% Critical Value 
15.3896  1  R = 0  15.8700 
3.3193  1  R <= 1  9.1600 
18.7089  1  R = 0  20.1800 
3.3193  1  R <= 1  9.1600 
 
 
Table 2.35 
Cointegration LR Test based on Maximum Eigenvalue of the Stochastic Matrix 
CRNF Statistic  Order of VAR  Null  95% Critical Value 
52.3801*  1  R = 0  15.8700 
7.2041*  1  R <= 1  9.1600 
59.5842*  1  R = 0  20.1800 
7.2041*  1  R <= 1  9.1600 
 
 
 
Table 2.36 
Cointegration LR Test based on Maximum Eigenvalue of the Stochastic Matrix 
CRG Statistic  Order of VAR  Null  95% Critical Value 
6.4518  1  R = 0  15.8700 
5.0221  1  R <= 1  9.1600 
11.4740  1  R = 0  20.1800 
5.0221  1  R <= 1  9.1600 
 
 
Table 2.37 
Cointegration LR Test based on Maximum Eigenvalue of the Stochastic Matrix 
DPC Statistic  Order of VAR  Null  95% Critical Value 
20.3686*  1  R = 0  15.8700 
8.8597*  1  R <= 1  9.1600 
29.2282*  1  R = 0  20.1800 
8.8597*  1  R <= 1  9.1600 
 
 
Table 2.38 
Cointegration LR Test based on Maximum Eigenvalue of the Stochastic Matrix 
DPCC Statistic  Order of VAR  Null  95% Critical Value 
38.6145*  1  R = 0  15.8700 
6.5107*  1  R <= 1  9.1600 
45.1252*  1  R = 0  20.1800 
6.5107*  1  R <= 1  9.1600 
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Table 2.39 
Cointegration LR Test based on Maximum Eigenvalue of the Stochastic Matrix 
SPR Statistic  Order of VAR  Null  95% Critical Value 
3.7357  1  R = 0  15.8700 
2.6988  1  R <= 1  9.1600 
6.4345  1  R = 0  20.1800 
2.6988  1  R <= 1  9.1600 
 
 
 
Table 2.40 
Cointegration LR Test based on Maximum Eigenvalue of the Stochastic Matrix 
EXIMP Statistic  Order of VAR  Null  95% Critical Value 
16.0398*  1  R = 0  15.8700 
7.8571*  1  R <= 1  9.1600 
23.8969*  1  R = 0  20.1800 
7.8571*  1  R <= 1  9.1600 
 
 
For Poland, the Maximum Eigenvalue and Trace Eigenvalue statistics both strongly reject 
the null hypothesis that there is no cointegration between Industrial Production and M0 – 
Maximum Eigenvalue only/M2/Credit to the Private Sector/ Credit to the Non Financial 
Sector/Deposits of Non Financial Sector in Commercial Banks/Deposits of Non Financial 
Sector in Central Bank and Commercial Banks/Exports and Imports but do not reject that 
there is one cointegration relation between the two variables.  The conclusion is that 
causation exists in at least one direction. 
 
Variables: 
IND = Industrial Production 
CRPR = Credit to the private sector 
TRS = Three Month Treasury Bill Rate 
CRNF = Credit to the non financial sector 
CRG = Credit to government 
DPC = Deposits of non financial sector in commercial banks 
DPCC = Deposits of non financial sector in central bank and commercial banks 
SPR = Interest rate spread (difference between interest rate on loans and deposits) 
EXIMP = Exports and imports 
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4.2.3  Granger Causality Tests on the ECM Representation 
Czech Republic 
 
Error Correction Model for Variable IND (Industrial Production) by OLS (Ordinary 
Least Squares) based on cointegration VAR 1 (vector autoregressive), Variable IND is 
dependent, other variables are independent 
 
Table 2.41  Supply Leading Hypothesis Tests 
Variables Co-efficient  of 
ECM Term 
T-ratio  F-Stat for ECM 
Term 
IND/M0  .026916  .43729   [.664]  4.0332* [.026] 
IND/M2  -.053062  -.49226 [.625]  1.3335   [.275] 
IND/CRG  -.0040896  -.24211 [.810]  2.6881* [.081] 
IND/DPC  -.035406  -.32633 [.746]  1.5568   [.224] 
IND/DPCC  -.012967  -.73879 [.464]   1.5892   [.215] 
IND/EXIMP  .030962  .82884  [.412]  1.8791   [.166] 
Note: P value in brackets 
*indicates rejection of the null hypothesis at the 95% significance level 
 
Error Correction Model for Variable IND (Industrial Production) by OLS (Ordinary 
Least Squares) based on cointegration VAR 1 (vector autoregressive), Financial 
Development Variables are dependent, Industrial Production is independent 
 
Table 2.42  Demand Leading Hypothesis Tests 
Variables Co-efficient  of 
ECM Term 
T-ratio  F-Stat for ECM 
Term 
M0/IND  .17247  .43729   [.664]  6.0668* [.005] 
M2/IND  -.11073  -.49226 [.625]  4.3917* [.019] 
CRG/IND  -.34908  -.24211 [.810]  1.0829   [.349] 
DPC/IND  -.07310  -.32633 [.746]  3,2703* [.049] 
DPCC/IND  -1.0132  -.73879 [.464]   3.3757* [.044] 
EXIMP/IND  -1474.0  -4.9002 [.000]  11.5896* [.000] 
Note: P value in brackets 
*indicates rejection of the null hypothesis at the 95% significance level 
 
The results show that for the Czech Republic, causality exists bi-directionally between 
Industrial Production and M0 i.e. growth causes financial development and financial 
development causes growth.  The supply leading hypothesis (i.e. financial development 
causes industrial production) also shows that credit to government causes growth.  The 
demand leading hypothesis (i.e. industrial development causes financial development) 
indicates that industrial production causes M2, Deposits of Non Financial Sector in 
Commercial Banks, Deposits of Non Financial Sector in Central Bank and Commercial 
Banks, and Exports and Imports.  The evidence is in favour of the demand leading 
hypothesis i.e. finance follows growth.  However there is no evidence that finance leads 
to growth in two cases. 
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Hungary 
 
Error Correction Model for Variable IND (Industrial Production) by OLS (Ordinary 
Least Squares) based on cointegration VAR 1 (vector autoregressive), Variable IND is 
dependent, other variables are independent 
 
Table 2.43  Supply Leading Hypothesis Tests 
Variables Co-efficient  of 
ECM Term 
T-ratio  F-Stat for ECM 
Term 
IND/M0  -.0054882  -.056825 [.955]  16.7400* [.000] 
IND/M2  -.040319  -.33946   [.736]   33.6339* [.000] 
IND/CRPR  .20975  2.8818    [.006]  8.2454*   [.001]  
IND/CRNF  .39302  4.0731    [.000]  8.6242*   [.001] 
IND/CRG  -.042546  -.94830   [.347]  10.6320* [.000] 
IND/DPC  -.052774  -.49456   [.622]  19.2308* [.000] 
IND/DPCC  -.051929  -.48254   [.631]   19.3666* [.000] 
IND/EXIMP  .036630  1.0515    [.297]  16.9637* [.000] 
Note: P value in brackets 
*indicates rejection of the null hypothesis at the 95% significance level 
 
Error Correction Model for Variable IND (Industrial Production) by OLS (Ordinary 
Least Squares) based on cointegration VAR 1 (vector autoregressive), Financial 
Development Variables are dependent, Industrial Production is independent 
 
Table 2.44  Demand Leading Hypothesis Tests 
Variables Co-efficient  of 
ECM Term 
T-ratio  F-Stat for ECM 
Term 
M0/IND  -.01101  -.056825 [.955]  1.6253   [.207] 
M2/IND  -.057030  -.33946   [.736]  1.6255   [.206] 
 
CRPR/IND 
                             
.64585 
 
2.8818    [.006] 
 
3.9690* [.025] 
CRNF/IND  .60658  4.0731    [.000]  6.9643* [.002] 
CRG/IND  -.39215  -.94830   [.347]  8.1974* [.001] 
DPC/IND  -.087361  -.49546   [.622]  4.4576* [.016] 
DPCC/IND  -.084232  -.48254   [.631]   4.7205* [.013] 
EXIMP/IND  312646.6  1.8753    [.070]  8.7529* [.000] 
Note: P value in brackets 
*indicates rejection of the null hypothesis at the 95% significance level 
 
For Hungary the results show that  finance causes growth for all the variables.  Six of the 
eight variables show that growth causes finance.  The two money variables M0 and M2, 
do not indicate that growth causes finance.  Overall the evidence points in favour of the 
supply leading hypothesis, though there is strong evidence for the demand leading 
hypothesis, thus showing the importance of all variables for the Hungarian economy. 
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Poland 
 
Error Correction Model for Variable IND (Industrial Production) by OLS (Ordinary 
Least Squares) based on cointegration VAR 1 (vector autoregressive), Variable IND is 
dependent, other variables are independent 
 
Table 2.45  Supply Leading Hypothesis Tests 
Variables Co-efficient  of 
ECM Term 
T-ratio  F-Stat for ECM 
Term 
IND/M0  .083144  .88445    [.380]  5.3476*   [.008] 
IND/M2  -.029907  -.20790   [.836]  3.5291*   [.037] 
IND/CRPR  -.0073851  -.48758   [.642]  2.7722*   [.072]  
IND/CRNF  -.088684  -.88310   [.381]  2.9048*   [.064] 
IND/DPC  .0095548  -.093079 [.926]  3.1866*   [.050] 
IND/DPCC  .048049  .36307    [.718]   4.3464*   [.018] 
IND/EXIMP  .0074906  .14842    [.883]  2.8468*   [.067] 
Note: P value in brackets 
*indicates rejection of the null hypothesis at the 95% significance level 
 
Error Correction Model for Variable IND (Industrial Production) by OLS (Ordinary 
Least Squares) based on cointegration VAR 1 (vector autoregressive), Financial 
Development Variables are dependent, Industrial Production is independent 
 
 
 
Table 2.46  Demand Leading Hypothesis Tests 
Variables Co-efficient  of 
ECM Term 
T-ratio  F-Stat for ECM 
Term 
M0/IND  .17494  .88445    [.380]  14.2318*[.000] 
M2/IND  -.027246  -.20790   [.836]  33.0880*[.000] 
CRPR/IND  -.55628  -.46758   [.642]  3.6079*  [.034] 
CRNF/IND  -.16351  -.88310   [.381]  32.5514*[.000] 
DPC/IND  .017106  .093079  [.926]  11.0719*[.000] 
DPCC/IND  .051251  .36307    [.718]   21.2428*[.000] 
EXIMP/IND  .055464  .14842    [.883]  2.1918*  [.122] 
Note: P value in brackets 
*indicates rejection of the null hypothesis at the 95% significance level 
 
Results for Poland show there is bi-directional causality between financial development 
and industrial development.  All of the variables support both the supply leading and 
demand leading hypotheses, therefore growth causes and follows finance, and vice versa. 
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5.0  Ratios of Financial Indicators and Industrial Production 
 
In this section, ratios are used to compare financial indicators to Industrial Production.  
As Industrial Production rose overall for the three countries over the time period studied, 
a higher ratio indicates an increase in the financial variable addressed. 
 
5.1  Ratios of M0 to Industrial Production 
  5.1.1 Ratio of M0 to Industrial Production in the Czech Republic 
Figure 1.1 
Ratio of M0/Industrial Production in 
Czech Republic 
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The M0 ratio increased from 1993 to 1996 and fell during 1997-1998 (see Appendix B: 
Table 5.1 for data).  It began to pick up in 1999 and by 2000 it began to rise further.  This 
rise continued upwards from 2000 to 2003, indicating an increasing supply of broad 
money.  
 
5.1.2. Ratio of M0 to Industrial Production i Hungary 
Figure 1.2 
Ratio of M0/Industrial Production 
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Overall M0 increased between 1990-2003 (see Appendix B: Table 5.2 for data).  From 
1990-1995 the ratio of M0 tripled with further increases in 1996.  There was a slight drop 
in 1997 but by 1998 it began increasing.  This trend continued upwards to the end of 
2003.       
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5.1.3. Ratio of M0 to Industrial Production in Poland 
 
Figure 1.3 
Ratio of M0 to Industrial 
Production in Poland
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The ratio of M0 to industrial production increased steadily in Poland over the thirteen 
years (see Appendix B: Table 5.3 for data).  By 1991 the ratio had tripled with increases 
year on year, apart from a slight dip at the beginning of 1999 and throughout 2000.  By 
2003 the trend had continued to rise upwards.   
 
 
5.2  Ratios of M2 to Industrial Production 
5.2.1. Ratio of M2 to Industrial Production in Hungary 
 
Figure 1.4 
Ratio of M2 to Industrial 
Production in the Czech Republic
0
10
20
1 4 7 1 01 31 61 92 22 52 83 13 43 74 04 3
Q1 1993 - Q4 2003
 
The ratio of M2 increased up to the beginning of 1996 (see Appendix A: Table 5.4 for 
data).  There was another small dip in 1997, and the beginning of 1999 and 2001.   
Overall it doubled between 1990 and 1998, with increases up to the end of 2003.  A 
higher ratio of M2 to industrial production, implies greater financial intermediary 
development.  This shows that greater intermediation took place overall between 1990 
and 2003, in the post financial liberalization period, indicating that financial liberalization 
was a factor that influenced positively, the degree of intermediation.   
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5.2.2. Ratio of M2 to Industrial Production in Hungary 
Figure 1.5 
Ratio of M2 to Industrial 
Production in Hungary
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The M2 ratio for Hungary more than doubled over the period 1990-1992 (see Appendix 
B for Table 5.5 for data).  There was an overall increase over time period, with slight falls  
at the beginning of 1998, 2000 and 2001.  From the beginning of liberalization, the M2 
ratio increased five fold, indicating the growing level of financial intermediation.   
 
5.2.3. Ratio of M0 to Industrial Production in Poland 
Figure 1.6 
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There was an increase in the ratio up to the middle of 2002 (see Appendix B: Table 5.6 
for data).  At various stages there were slight fall: at the beginning of 1998, in 1999 
and2000.  Overall liberalisation led to M2 and therefore the level of financial 
intermediation increasing, though 2003 saw a fall in all quarters with figures returning to 
2001 levels.   
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5.3  Ratios of Three Month Treasury Bill Rate to Industrial Production 
5.3.1. Ratio of Three Month Treasury Bill Rate to Industrial Production in the 
Czech Republic 
Figure 1.7 
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The ratio followed a cycle of increases and falls up to 1998 with large reduction in 1999.   
(see Appendix B: Table 5.7 for data).  This reduction continued through 2001 and 2003 
though it leveled out.  By 2003 it had fallen to its lowest level.   
 
 
5.3.2. Ratio of Three Month Treasury Bill Rate to Industrial Production in 
Hungary 
Figure 1.8 
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The ratio followed a cycle of sustained increases, then falls, until 1996 when it fell to the 
lowest levels since financial liberalization (see Appendix A: Table 5.8 for data). 
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5.3.3. Ratio of Three Month Treasury Bill Rate to Industrial Production in Poland 
 
Figure 1.9 
 
Ratio of 3 Mth Trs Bill Rate to 
Industrial Production in Poland
0
0.5
1
1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37
Q1 1992 - Q3 2001
 
There was an overall fall in the ratio over the time period with figures not available for 
the Treasury Bill Rate for the end of 2001/beginning of 2002 and the end of 2002 (see 
Appendix A: Tables 5.9 for data). 
 
5.4  Ratios of Private Sector Credit to Domestic Credit  
5.4.1. Ratio of Private Sector Credit to Domestic Credit in the Czech Republic 
Figure 1.10 
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The ratio of private sector credit remained steady until 2000 and then fell and continued 
downwards (see Appendix B: Table 5.10 for data).  This ratio measures the magnitude of 
the banking sector.  The absence of any real increase in this ratio, indicates the absence of 
large credit markets for households.  
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5.4.2. Ratio of Private Sector Credit to Domestic Credit in the Czech Republic 
Figure 1.11 
Ratio of Private Sector Credit to 
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The ratio fell and then made large increases towards the end of the time period (see 
Appendix B: Table 5.11 for data).  The increase in the ratio measures the extent to which 
private sector credit was responsible for the quantity and quality of investment, and for 
economic growth.   
 
 
5.4.3. Ratio of Private Sector Credit to Domestic Credit in the Czech Republic 
Figure 1.12 
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Private Sector Credit had an initial increase though there was a sustained fall up to 1995 
(see Appendix B: Table 5.12 for data).  From there on there was a steady rise up to the 
end of 2003.  While the final figure was less than that at the beginning of 1990 and 
financial liberalization, the improving ratio at the end of the 1990’s and beginning of 
000’s indicates improving credit availability for households and increasing investment 
opportunities.   
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5.5  Ratios of Credit to Government to Total Credit  
5.5.1. Ratio of Credit to Government to Total Credit in the Czech Republic 
Figure 1.13 
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The ratio moved slightly from 1990-1992, hovering above/below zero (see Appendix B:  
Table 5.13 for data).  It then escalated after 1992 right up to the end 1993.  The amount 
available for government credit indicates how active the government is in investment 
projects.  The higher rates towards the end of the era show the reduction in credit 
available for private sector projects.   
 
 
5.5.2. Ratio of Credit to Government to Total Credit in Hungary 
 
Figure 1.14 
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The ratio moved upwards from 1990-1996, indicating that the government continued to 
be a strong contender when it came to credit allocation (see Appendix A: Table 5.14 for 
data).  This trend was reversed from 1996 onwards, when ratios of government credit to 
domestic credit began to fall.  This reduction in ratio continued to the end of 2003.   
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5.5.3. Ratio of Credit to Government to Total Credit in Poland     
Figure 1.15 
Ratio of Government Credit to 
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The ratio increased up to 1995 when it then began to reduce.  This trend downwards 
continued to 2002, when the ratio began to fluctuate slightly and leveling off (see 
Appendix B: Tables 5.15 for data).  The lowering rates in the mid to late nineties and 
later, indicate the stronger position of the private sector market in getting access to credit, 
with the government supply of credit being lowered.   
 
5.6  Ratios of Deposits of Non Financial Sector in Commercial Banks to Deposits of 
Non Financial Sector in Central Bank and Commercial Banks   
5.6.1. Ratio of Deposits of Non Financial Sector in Commercial Banks to 
Deposits of Non Financial Sector in Central Bank and Commercial Banks in the 
Czech Republic 
Figure 1.16 
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The ratio of domestic credit issued by deposit banks, to domestic credit issued by deposit 
banks and the central bank, measures the role of the central bank in lending activities (see 
Appendix B: Table 5.16 for data).  Here the ratio increased slightly overall, over the time 
period.  Generally a lower amount of loans issued by the Central Bank is deemed as 
preferable, as commercial banks are assumed to be able to select higher return projects.   
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5.6.2. Ratio of Deposits of Non Financial Sector in Commercial Banks to 
Deposits of Non Financial Sector in Central Bank and Commercial Banks in 
Hungary 
 
Figure 1.17 
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The ratio remained steady for Hungary with a dip at the beginning of 1994 (see Appendix 
B: Table 5.17 for data).  It indicates that the central bank remained a strong contender in 
lending activities throughout the period.   
 
5.6.3. Ratio of Deposits of Non Financial Sector in Commercial Banks to 
Deposits of Non Financial Sector in Central Bank and Commercial Banks in 
Poland 
Figure 1.18 
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There was steady ratio up until 1998 when it increased slightly (see Appendix A: Table 
5.18 for data).  This increase continued until the end of the time period covered, 
indicating the strong presence of the central bank in lending activities.   
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5.7  Ratios of Interest Rate Spread to Industrial Production   
5.7.1. Ratio of Interest Rate Spread to Industrial Production in the Czech Republic 
 
Figure 1.19 
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Overall the ratio reduced considerably over the time period to more than half the figure in 
1993 (see Appendix B: Table 5.19 for data).  The reduction in interest rate spread 
indicates the reduction in resources absorbed by the banking sector.  This shows 
increasing efficiency of the banking sector after financial liberalization.   
 
5.7.2. Ratio of Interest Rate Spread to Industrial Production in Hungary 
Figure 1.20 
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There was an initial increase in the ratio up to 1992 (see Appendix B: Table 5.20 for 
data).  This was followed by ongoing reduction with final figures ending just above zero.  
This indicated stronger efficiency of Hungarian banks.   
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5.7.3. Ratio of Interest Rate Spread to Industrial Production in Poland 
Figure 1.21 
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High interest rates at the beginning of the 1990’s quickly led to rates falling dramatically 
to reflect the increased competitiveness and efficiency in the Polish banking system (see 
Appendix A: Table 5.21 for data). 
 
5.8  Ratios of Total Exports and Imports to Nominal GDP 
5.8.1. Ratio of Total Exports and Imports to Nominal GDP in the Czech Republic 
Figure 1.22 
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The ratio showed an overall increase over the time period (see Appendix B: Table 5.22 
for data).  This indicates an increased openness in the Czech economy, after financial 
liberalisation.   
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5.8.2. Ratio of Total Exports and Imports to Nominal GDP in Hungary 
Figure 1.23 
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The ratio increased in Hungary up to 2000 with some falls over the next two years.  2003 
recorded an increase in the ratio (see Appendix A: Table 5.23 for data).  This indicates 
that overall the Hungarian economy increased its openness after financial deregulation.   
 
5.8.3. Ratio of Total Exports and Imports to Nominal GDP in Poland 
Figure 1.24 
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There was an increase over the time period, showing that openness of the economy 
increased after financial liberalization (see Appendix A: Table 5.24 for data).  In 2003 the 
highest records of open trade were recorded for the Polish economy.   
 
 
6.0  Analysis of Bank Profitability 
 
In this section the profitability (returns) of banks during 1990-2003 are examined, after 
financial deregulation.  Operational efficiency or profitability, is described by Akyuz
49 as 
the cost efficiency in producing finance, in the process of intermediation between final 
lenders and borrowers, which depends on the efficiency of the use of resources in 
financial activities.  Financial ratios are used.  With ratio analysis there is debate over the 
choice of benchmark to use.  See Al-Shimmari
50 who states precisely this, and also adds 
                                                 
49 Akyuz, Y (1992) “On Financial Deepening and Efficiency”, United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development, Geneva 
50 Al-Shimmari, M. and Alimi, A. “Modelling the Operating Efficiency of Banks: a Nonparametric 
Methodology”, Logistics Information Management, Volume 11, Issue 1, 1998, pp5-17   50
that a single ratio does not provide sufficient information about the performance of a 
firm.  To overcome this, widely recognized benchmarks adopted in EU countries are 
used, namely: 
 
 
i)  Profitability ratios to measure the earnings ability of a firm: 
a)  ROE – return on equity.  This compares net income after tax to equity 
capital.  It shows the rate of return shareholders receive from investing their 
capital.  The higher the ratio, the higher the return.   
 
b)  ROA – return on assets.  We divide net income by total assets.  It shows 
the banks’ capability in increasing earnings from its assets.  The higher the ratio, 
the better the management of assets. 
 
c)  EM – equity multiplier.  We divide total assets by equity capital.  This 
measures the banks’ financial leverage.  The higher the multiplier, the greater the 
probability of insolvency as equity must be used to absorb losses on the banks’ 
assets. 
 
 
ii)  Efficiency ratios to measure effectiveness of banks: 
  d)  Non-Interest Earnings to Total Assets 
 
  e)  Total Expenses to Total Assets 
 
The data is limited, due to difficulties in getting financial reports in English for the time 
period.  Nonetheless the results indicate the openness of financial deregulation on bank 
allocational efficiency (profitability) and operational efficiency.  Thirteen banks were 
used: size in the Czech Republic, three in Hungary and four in Poland.  They represent 
one thousand, nine hundred and ninety nine DMU’s (decision making units), which are 
averaged over the time period. 
 
6.1  Return on Equity 
 
We use ROE which compares net income after tax to equity capital.  It measures the rate 
of return shareholders received from their investment, 
 
Table 3.0   
Average Returns on Equity for the Czech Republic
51  
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
-0.423  0,018 5.892 -.0592  -4.119  0.262 0.652 3.046 4.595 4.106 
Czech banks saw a rise in ROE up to 1996, and then experienced a sharp fall in 1997-
1998.  Returns began to rise in 1999 and 2000.  2001 saw an increase which continued 
into 2002.  There was a small drop in 2003 but overall there was an increase in return on 
                                                 
51 Banks: Ceska Sporitelna A.S. 2002-2003. Vseobecni Stavebni Sporitelni Komercni Banka A.S. 1999-
2003, CMHB 1994-2003, Komercni Banka 1996-2002, Czech Export Bank 1995-2003, KOBP 1997-1998   51
equities from the nineties onwards.  This represented a positive position for shareholders, 
as the higher the ratio the greater the return they received on their investment.  (See 
Appendix B: Figure 5.73 for graph) 
 
Table 3.1   
Average Returns on Equity for Hungary
52 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
29.65 29.97 22.30 6.135 6.280 7.633 7.694 7.526 
  
Table 3.2 
ROE (National Bank of Hungary, before adjustment for non-performing loans) 
Real Figures 
    1988   1989   1990 
    %    %    %  
Large  Banks    30.0   27.8   18.0 
Small  and  Medium  Banks  12.6   11.6   18.0  
Savings  Banks    138.7   167.2   81.4 
Special Finance Institutions  -0.8    -6.5    -7.5 
 
Hungarian banks ROE fell during the mid nineties and dropped dramatically in 1999.  
There was some recovery from 2000 onwards but figures were well below those at the 
beginning of the period.  Figures released by the NBH show that overall ROE fell for all 
sectors between 1988-1990: large banks, small and medium banks, savings banks and 
special finance institutions.  Investors received falling returns on their investment, thus 
forcing investors to look elsewhere for higher return projects.  (See Appendix B: Figure 
5.74 for graph). 
 
 
Table 3.3 
Average Return on Equity for Poland
53 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 99  00  01  02 
40.9 70.1 0.47 0.59 0.87 2.30 2.60 2.62 1.86 .86  .08  .11  -.04 
Polish banks’ ROE saw a dramatic fall in 1992.  There was some recovery up to 1995 
which continued up to 1997.  Returns began to fall and continued to fall up to 2002.  
Investment in Polish banks would not have been an attractive proposition for prospective 
investors.  (See Appendix B: Figure 5.75 for graph). 
 
 
6.2  Return on Assets 
 
Here there is examination of banks’ ability to increase earnings from its assets.  There is 
division of net income by total assets.  The higher the ratio, the better the management of 
a bank. 
 
                                                 
52 Banks: CIB, 1996-2003, OTB 1999-2000, Altalanos Erket 1999-2003 
53 Banks: Banka Slaski 1990-1999, Bank Rozwoju Eksportu 1990-2002, WestLB Bank Polsk 1998-2002   52
Table 3.4 
Average Return on Assets in the Czech Republic
54 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
-.034 .013  1.283 -.016 -.801 -.0565  -.003 .774  .784  .825 
The Czech Republic’s ROA had mixed fortunes.  There were increases in 1995-1996.  
Return fell from 1997 onwards, with figures moving from negative to positive figures in 
2001 though returns were relatively low.  This indicated reduced earnings and an inability 
to strengthen this position by Czech banks.  (See Appendix B: Figure 5.76 for graph). 
 
 
Table 3.5 
Average Return on Assets in Hungary
55 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
3.32 3.18 2.22 1.916  1.896  1.355  27.73  1.160 
 
Table 3.6 
ROA (National Bank of Hungary, before adjustment for non-performing loans) 
Real Figures 
     1988   1989   1990   
     %    %    %  
Large  Banks     3.4   4.4   4.4 
Small  &  Medium  Banks   7.0   7.1   6.4 
Savings  Banks     2.3   3.8   3.6 
Special  Financial  Institutions   6.2   3.4   6.3    
 
Hungary’s ROA fell during the late nineties, and they experienced a large rise in 2002.  
The figures released by the NBH show steady returns from 1988-1990/  (See Appendix 
B: Figure 5.77 for graph). 
 
 
Table 3.7 
Average Returns on Assets in Poland
56 
 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 99  00  01  02 
.096 .013 .031 .054 .06  .058 .049 .032 .039 .034 .006  .009  -
.023
Polish banks showed decreasing ROA over the period 1990-2002.  While there were 
some small increases in the early to mid nineties, overall returns fell during the period 
reflected.  (See Appendix B: Figure 5.78 for graph). 
 
 
                                                 
54 Banks: Ceska Sporitelna 1992-2002, VSSKB 1999-2003, CMHB 1994-2003, Komercni Banka 1996-
2002, Czech Export Bank 1995-2003, KOBP 1997-1998 
55 Banks: CIB 1996-2002, OTP 1999-2000, Altalanos Erket 1999-2003  
56 Banks: Bank Slaski 1990-1999, Bank Rojwoju Eksportu 1990-1996, Bre Bank, 1997-1998, Nordea 
1999-2002, WestLB Polska 1998-2002   53
6.3  Equity Multiplier 
 
There is measurement of the banks’ financial leverage which is found by dividing total 
assets by equity capital.  The higher the multiplier, the greater the probability of 
insolvency, as equity must be used to absorb losses on the bank’s assets. 
  
Table 3.8   
Average Equity Multiplier in the Czech Republic
57 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 00  01  02  03 
12.351 10.358 21.034 34.985 36.353 56.441 56.158 33.392 62.176 47.776
The Czech’s EM increased overall over the time period.  There were increases between 
1996-1999, with a large fall in 2001.  There was a further increase in 2002 with a fall in 
2003.  The overall increase represents a deteriorating position for the Czech Republic as 
more and more equity was needed to clear up losses incurred.  (See Appendix B: Figure 
5.79 for graph). 
 
Table 3.9 
Average Equity Multiplier in Hungary
58 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
9.363 8.929 8.194 81.046  77.740  18.358  20.843  22.999 
The Hungarian EM experienced a large rise in 1999-2000.  There was a fall in 2001 with 
small increases in 2002-2003.  Hungary’s position had stabilized by 2001, which 
indicates the bank’s willingness to address losses incurred in the previous period.  (See 
Appendix B: Figure 5.80 for graph). 
 
 
Table 3.10   
Average Equity Multiplier in Poland
59 
 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 00  01  02 
642  28.1 38.1 28.4 15.5 75.5 96.4 143  259  183  18.5 28.4 22 
Poland’s EM fell in 1991 though there was a recovery in 1995-1998.  Large reductions 
were experienced in 2000-2002, indicating increased responsiveness by banks in 
monitoring loss making areas of activity.  (See Appendix B: Figure 5.81 for graph). 
 
7.0      Analysis of Bank Efficiency   
 
In this section bank efficiency is examined over the period 1990-2003 in the three 
countries.  Financial ratio analysis of bank efficiency indicates the competitiveness of 
banks, in that it sows the cost of transforming bank liability and assets in earning assets. 
 
                                                 
57 Banks: Ceska Sporitelna 1992-2002, Vseobecna Stavebni Sporitelna Komercni Banka, A.S. 1999-20003, 
CMHB 1994-2003, Komercni Bank 1996-2000, Czech Export Bank 1995-2003, KOB 1997-1998 
58 Banks: CIB 1996-2003, OTB 1999-2003, Altalanos Erket 1999-2003 
59 Banks: Bank Slaski 1990-1999, Bank Rojwoju Eksortu 1990-1996, Bre 1997-1998, Nordea 1999-2002, 
WestLB Bank Polska 1998-2002   54
Akyuz
60 defines allocative efficiency as allocating scarce savings to investors, with the 
most socially productive use for them.  Allocative efficiency and operations efficiency 
are related in the following way: when financial institutions decide on interest rates for 
borrowers (assuming ceiling rates are not in operation), they determine this rate based on 
the possibility of default.  Financial institutions decide where to invest in order to receive 
the maximum return.  This expected rate of return must be high enough to cover the 
borrower’s risk and the rate of interest received by the lender, which is determined by the 
borrower’s risk as well as the lender’s risk.  When the financial institutions are involved 
in the lender’s investment, they will be in a better position to judge the likely success of 
the venture and the risk involved.  When this is not the case, the possibility of default 
increases.  This increases the lender’s risk and the cost of finance.  Here allocative 
inefficiency increases the cost (productive) inefficiency.  The productive efficiency of the  
financial sector is related to the stability of the financial system and its ability to reduce 
the risk needed to cover the capital-value uncertainty.  The search for greater allocative 
efficiency through financial liberalisation may reduce the productive efficiency of the 
financial system by increasing financial instability, and increasing the cost of finance to 
investors. 
 
 
7.1     Average Non-Interest Expenses to Assets Ratio
61 
Table 3.11 
Czech Republic (average figures) 
 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
0.023 -0.331  -0.688  4.440 0.042 3.070 3.064 1.544 5.493 2.827 
This ratio showed increases in 1997, 199-2000 and 2002.  All these increases were 
followed by reductions in following years, indicating mixed results.  (See Appendix B: 
Figure 5.82 for graph). 
 
Table 3.12 
Hungary (average figures)
62 
 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
0.005 0.053 0.068 0.028 0.051 0.056 
Hungary experienced a rising ratio when then fell in 2001.  It began to rise again, 
indicating that assets were being utilized more effectively.  (See Appendix B: Figure 5.83 
for graph) 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
60 Op. Cit. 1992 
61 Banks: Ceska Sporitelna A.S. 1992-2002, Vseobecni Stavebni Sporitelna Komercni Banka A.S. 1999-
2003, CMHB 1994-2003, Komercni Banka 1996-2002, Czech Export Bank 1995-2003, KOBP 1997-1998 
62 Banks: CIB 1998-2003, OTB 199-2000, Artalanos Erket 1999-2003   55
Table 3.13 
Poland (average figures)
63 
 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 01  02 
0.30 0.58 0.29 0.47 0.52 0.16 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.13 0.10 0.09 .07 
Poland’s ratio had mixed results, with rises and falls up to 1995.  This was followed by 
falling ratios during the late nineties, indicating that assets were not being used as 
efficiency as previously.  (See Appendix B: Figure 5.84 got graph) 
 
7.2  Total Expenses to Total Assets 
Table 3.14 
Czech Republic (average figures)
64 
 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
-0.12 -0.16 -0.04 -0.17 -0.17 -0.16 -0.13 -0.12 -0.16 -0.14 
The Czech Republic’s ratio preformed badly in 1996, indicating that expenses were rising 
relative to assets.  This leveled out in the late nineties, and from 2000-2003, showing that 
banks addressed high expense areas of activity.  (See Appendix B: Figure 5.85 for graph) 
 
 
Table 3.15 
Hungary (average figures)
65 
 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
-0.093 -7.099 -4.763 -0.045 -0.030 -0.036 
Hungarian banks had a falling ratio up to 2001, with the ratio leveling off in the final two 
years, indicating rising expenses.  (See Appendix B: Figure 5.86 for graph) 
 
 
Table 3.16 
Poland (average figures)
66 
 
90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 
-.10 -2.6 -.31 -1.5 -.19 -.16 -.11 -.22 -.24 -.21 -.10 -.06 -.07 
Poland had an increased, then a reduced ratio from 1990-1993, when the ratio leveled off.  
This showed that banks expenses were being monitored to ensure that excessive levels 
were not reached.  (See Appendix B: Figure 5.87) 
 
 
                                                 
63 Banks: Bank Slaski 1990-1999, Bank Rojzwoju Eksportu 1990-1998, Nordea 1999-2002, WestLB Bank 
Polski 1998-2002 
64 Banks: Ceska Sporitelna A. S. 1992-2002, Vseobecni Stavebni Sporitelna Komercni Banka A.S. 1999-
2003, CMHB, 1994-2003, Komercni Banka 1996-1999 
65 Banks: CIB 1998-1999, OTB 1999-2000, Altalanos Erket 1999-2003 
66 Banks: Banks Slaski 1990-1999, Bank Rojzwoju Eksportu 1990-1996, Bre 1997-1998, Nordea 1999-
2002, WestLB Bank Polska 1998-2002   56
8.0      Bad Loans as a Percentage of Overall Loans 
Table 3.17 
Czech Republic (average figures)
67 
1994  1995  1996  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
3.108E-
05 
1.058E-
03 
8.839E-
03 
0.063 0.075 0.016 0.027 0.020 0.024 2.202E-
02 
 
The bad loan problem for the Czech Republic improved in 1995, though the figure 
increased in 1996.  The mid nineties saw an improvement with a large fall in the figure in 
1999.  By 2003 the figure had risen again, though not to the same proportions as 
experienced in the mid nineties.  The Czech Republic had previously been viewed as one 
that took a soft view of bad loans, as the NBF gave handouts and the KOB took on 
transferred bad loans.  Bankruptcy proceedings were slow and uncertain for creditors.  
Sine 2001 the CNB Banking Supervision had taken an active role in terminating banking 
licenses for various misdemeanors, such as weakening financial conditions and non-
compliance with prudential rules.  (See Appendix B:  Figure 5.88 for graph) 
 
 
Table 3.18 
Hungary (average figures)
68 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
0.036 0.108 0.069 0.032 0.013 
Hungary saw an increase in the bad loan ratio in 1999, though the figure fell up to 2002.  
Hungary has addressed its bad loan problem, to a large degree.  Though the State has had 
to intervene on many occasions in the past, to clear the bad loan problem, strengthened 
banking regulations have led to bad loans falling.  Credit limits were put on lending to 
individuals/firms and new standards were applied to define loan losses.  (See Appendix 
B: Figure 5.89 for graph) 
 
Table 3.19 
Poland
69 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
0.712 0.739 0.150 0.366 0.046 0.026 0.001 0.008 0.021 0.041 
Poland’s bad loan ratio fell dramatically by 1995, it rose in 1996 and then began to fall 
again up to 2000.  2001 saw an increase in the bad loan problem, which rose again in 
2002.  Poland took many steps to address the situation – conciliation proceedings were 
used by banks to deal with bad debtors.  Weaker banks were put under mandatory 
control.  This helped the loan problem to reduce to manageable proportions.   
Unfortunately a declining economic climate in 2001 led to household finance falling,  
with a knock on effect on the loan situation.  (See Appendix B: Figure 5.90 for graph)   
 
                                                 
67 Banks: CMHB 1994-2000, CEB 2002-2003, Ceska Sporitelna 1995-2003, KOBP 1997-1998, 2002-2003 
68 Banks: Altalanos 199-2003, OTP 1999-2000, CIB 1998-2001, Komercni Banka 1998-1999 
69 Banks: Bank Slaski 1990-1999, Bank Rojzwoju Eksportu 1990-1996, Nordea 1995-2002,  Bre 1996-
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Table 3.20 
Ratio of Irregular Claims to Gross Claims on Non-Financial Customers (%) 
   Total   Substandard   Doubtful   Loss 
Banking Sector   
1993    30.1   7.3    6.1    16.7 
1994    27.9   5.8    5.4    16.7 
1995    20.4   5.2    3.4    11.8 
1996    12.7   3.9    1.6    7.2 
1997    10.2   3.8    1.2    5.2 
1998    10.5   3.9    1.9    4.7 
1999    13.3   5.1    3.4    4.8 
2000    15.0   4.4    5.1    5.5 
2001    17.9   4.6    5.1    8.2 
2002    20.1   4.8    5.8    9.5 
Commercial Banks 
1993    31.0   7.5    6.4    17.1 
1994    28.5   5.9.    5.7    26.9 
1995    20.9   5.4    3.5    12.0 
1996    13.2   4.1    1.7    7.4 
1997    10.5   3.9    1.2    5.4 
1998    10.9   4.0    2.0    4.9 
1999    13.7   5.3    3.6    4.8 
2000    15.5   4.5    5.4    5.6 
2001    18.6   4.8    5.3    8.5 
2002    21.0   5.0    6.1    9.9 
Cooperative Banks 
1993    24.4   5.5    41.    14.8 
1994    21.3   3.8    2.4    15.1 
1995    11.7   1.9    1.1    8.7 
1996    5.3   1.2    0.4    3.7 
1997    3.7   1.1    0.4    2.2 
1998    3.5   1.2    0.5    1.8 
1999    3.6   1.4    0.5    1.7 
2000    4.5   1.7    0.7    2.1 
2001    6.2   2.0    1.1    3.0 
2002    6.5   2.2    1.2    3.2 
Central Bank of Poland 2003 
The Central Bank’s figure show that bank loans, resulting in losses for the commercial 
banking sector, fell up to 2000 but then began to rise in 2002.  This indicates the banks’ 
dependence on a strong economic climate in order to be able to maintain credible and 
quality loan portfolios.     
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9.0      Summary of Results and Theoretical Relationship between Financial Sector 
Development and Economic Growth 
 
The regulation debate is strongly defended by Arestis
70, who states that low real interest 
rates do not prevent economic growth.  This scenario is also supported when financial 
deregulation is in place.  It is backed up by figures from the Czech Republic, Hungary 
and Poland (see Tables 5.19 – 5.21 for interest rate spreads and industrial production).  In 
the three countries, as the spread of interest rates fell from a high of almost 8% in the 
Czech Republic to between 3-4%, from 5% to 2% in Hungary and 1758% to minus 
figures in Poland, (while inflation also fell) industrial production increased over time.  
Data for the three countries back up Shaw’s
71 assertion that financial liberalisation 
increases the monetary sector – see Tables 5.1-5.6 for M0 and M2 after 1989.  It also 
contradicts Stiglitz
72 who claims that government intervention leads to improved quality 
of loan applications.  For all three countries, state involvement in banks was reduced 
continuously since 1989, and for all three countries bad loans fell over the time period 
1990-2003 (though the Czech Republic saw an increase in bad loans in 2003 for the bank 
surveyed – see Table 3.17).  Industrial Production increased for the three countries, 
supporting Everett
73 and Kelly’s view that financial liberalisation supports growth.   
Greater financial intermediation is seen with the growth of M2 over time in the three 
countries.  This supports King and Levine’s studies
74, that banking sector development 
contributes to economic growth and leads to faster growth.  It also adds to Barth’s view
75 
that state involvement with banks leads to poorly developed banks.  In these three 
countries, once the state reduced its role in banking activities, financial markets and 
financial instruments increased and developed. 
 
 
10.  Conclusion    
 
In this section the questions posed at the beginning of the chapter are answered, namely: 
i)  does financial deregulation lead to financial development in the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Poland? 
  
                                                 
70 Arestis, P. and Demetriades, P. “On Financial Repression and Economic Development: the case of 
Cyprus”, Department of Economics and Management Science, Working Paper, 91-23, October 1991, pp1-
22 
71 Shaw, Edward S. Financial Deepening in Economic Development, Chapter 1: Financial Deepening, New 
York, Oxford University Press, 1973, pp9 
72 Stiglitz, J. and Weiss, A. “Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information”, American Economic 
Review, 1981, 77, (3), pp393-410 
73 Kelly, John and Everett, Mary. “Financial Liberalisation and Economic Growth in Ireland”, Quarterly 
Bulletin, Central Bank, Autumn 2004, pp91-112 
74 King, R.G. and Levine, R. “Finance and Growth: Schumpter Might be Right”, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 1993a, 108, pp717-738 
75 Barth, J.R. Caprio, G. and Levine, R. “Banking Systems Around the Globe: Do Regulation and 
Ownership Affect Performance and Stability?”, Finance Department, Auburn University and Capital 
Studies Division, Milken Institute, 2000, pp1-63 
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For all three countries, the monetary base M0 and M2 increased over the time period 
studied, indicating an increased supply of broad money and an increased degree of 
intermediation 
 
ii)  does financial development lead to economic growth in the three countries? 
 
Hungary experienced an increase in the ratio of private sector credit overall, which is a 
major instrument for economic growth.  The Czech Republic had steady credit for most 
of the time period, while Poland showed increases from the mid nineties onwards.   
Overall indicators indicate that increased development of financial markets led to 
economic growth. 
 
iii)  is causality established between financial deregulation/financial development and 
economic growth? 
 
Results show a causal relationship between M0/M2/Deposits of Non Financial Sector in 
Commercial Banks/and the Central Bank/Exports and Imports/ and Industrial Production 
for all three countries.  There is also a relationship between Credit to Government and 
Industrial Production for the Czech Republic and Hungary, between Credit to the Private 
Sector/Non Financial Sector and Industrial Production, for Hungary and Poland. 
 
iv)  what direction does it take? 
 
Czech Republic 
 
There is bi-directional causality between M0 and Industrial Production.  Credit to 
Government causes Industrial Production, M2, Deposits of Non Financial Sector in 
Commercial Banks, Deposits of Non Financial Sector in Commercial Banks and the 
Central Bank, and Exports and Imports are caused by Industrial Production. 
 
Hungary 
 
There is bi-directional causality between Credit to the Private Sector, Credit to Non 
Financial Sector, Credit to Government, Deposits of Non Financial Sector in Commercial 
Banks, Deposits of Non Financial Sector in Commercial Banks and the Central Bank, 
Exports and Imports, and Industrial Production.  There is also uni-directional causality 
between M0 and M2 and Industrial Production i.e. M0 and M2 cause Industrial 
Production. 
 
Poland 
 
There is bi-directional causality between all financial variables – M0, M2, Credit to 
Private Sector, Credit to Non Financial Sector, Deposits of Non Financial Sector in 
Commercial Banks, Deposits of Non Financial Sector in Commercial Banks and the 
Central Bank, Exports and Imports, and Industrial Production. 
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